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THE PUBLIC CHOICE PROBLEM IN
CORPORATE LAW: CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY AFTER CITIZENS UNITED*
DAVID G. YOSIFON**
The Supreme Court recently held in Citizens United v. Federal
Elections Commission (2010) that the First Amendment forbids
Congress from restricting the political speech of corporations. While
corporate theory did little to inform the Court’s thinking in Citizens
United, this Article argues that the holding in Citizens United requires
us to rethink corporate theory. The shareholder primacy norm in
American corporate governance relies on the assumption that
corporations can be restrained from influencing external governmental
operations. We can enjoy the efficiencies generated by shareholder
primacy in corporate governance, mainstream corporate theorists have
long argued, because we can rely on external regulation to curb or cure
the excesses that such a framework will predictably visit upon nonshareholding stakeholders, such as workers, consumers, and
communities. Citizens United removes this lynchpin from canonical
justifications for exclusive shareholder orientation in firm governance.
This Article argues that if we cannot as a matter of constitutional law
keep corporations out of our democracy, then we must as a matter of
corporate law have more democracy in our corporations. After
Citizens United, we must begin to restructure corporate law to require
boards of directors to actively attend to the interests of multiple
stakeholders at the level of firm governance.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article develops a new argument for why corporate law
should depart from the shareholder primacy norm which presently
dominates American corporate governance. I begin by highlighting
shareholder primacy theory’s reliance on the availability of external
government regulation to curb corporate exploitation of nonshareholding stakeholders in corporate enterprise, including workers,
consumers, and communities. I then argue that the shareholder
primacy norm itself engenders a public choice problem that makes
reliance on such external regulation implausible. Profit-seeking
corporations work to undermine the development of the very
regulation that shareholder primacy theory charges with curbing
corporate operations. Because of their capital concentration, limited
liability, singular focus, and relatively small numbers compared to
other interest groups, corporations can routinely best other
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constituencies in the competition for regulatory favor. This public
choice problem is well recognized within regulatory theory generally,
but it is under-theorized in corporate law. When forced to confront
this public choice problem, shareholder primacists usually prescribe
greater regulation of corporate political activity in order to insulate
the political process from corporate influence. But the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Citizens United v. Federal Elections
Commission1 makes clear that the First Amendment precludes such a
response.
Confronting this analytic dead end, this Article concludes that
the only viable response to the public choice problem in corporate
law is to alter corporate governance law so that firms are not
managed in the exclusive interests of shareholders, but instead
operate under a multi-stakeholder regime which requires directors to
attend directly to the interests of multiple stakeholders at the level of
firm governance. This Article examines in particular the implications
of charging firm managers with being fiduciaries of consumers, as the
interests of consumers as corporate stakeholders is largely
undeveloped in corporate law scholarship.2 Having reached the
conclusion that multi-stakeholder corporate governance is necessary,
the Article then demonstrates that implementing a multi-stakeholder
regime is feasible and requires little departure from the fundamental
mechanics of corporate governance already in place under the
shareholder primacy regime.
My argument relies on a series of premises with which most
conservative scholars have long agreed, and which many liberal
scholars have traditionally resisted, in pursuit of a conclusion that
many liberal scholars have long sought, and which I will argue
conservatives scholars can no longer deny.
I. THE PUBLIC CHOICE PROBLEM IN CORPORATE LAW
A. The Shareholder Primacy Norm
Contemporary corporate theory views the corporation as a
“nexus-of-contracts” comprised of the various stakeholders in
corporate enterprise, including shareholders, creditors, workers, and

1. 130 S. Ct. 876, 880 (2010).
2. See generally David Yosifon, The Consumer Interest in Corporate Law, 43 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 253 (2009) (endeavoring to help fill this gap with a broad analysis of the
consumer interest in contemporary corporate theory and extant corporate law).
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consumers.3 In the canonical account, firm directors are charged with
running the firm in the best interests of shareholders not because
shareholders “own” the corporation, but because shareholder
primacy in firm governance is the “term” that all of the parties to the
corporate nexus would agree to if they actually sat around a
bargaining table and negotiated with each other.4
Primacy in firm governance provides shareholders the repose
they need to invest in diverse enterprises in which they will exercise
no day-to-day control, or even much episodic influence. While
shareholders thus require the faithful agency of the board of
directors, other stakeholders are thought to be capable of managing
their own interests in the corporate enterprise. Workers are present
on the shop floor and can negotiate their wages and conditions of
employment with management directly or through labor unions.5
Consumers are present at the cash register and can directly inspect
and bargain about the quality of the goods and services they desire, or
more usually, they can manage their interests simply by accepting or
rejecting a price stipulated by firm managers.6
Corporate boards can advance shareholder interests in two
sometimes-overlapping ways. First, they can strive to increase the
overall gains to trade among all parties within the corporate nexus.
Second, they can work to increase the percentage of the shareholders’
slice of the pie. All stakeholders potentially gain when directors
develop organizational efficiencies, but shareholder primacy also
pushes managers to exploit non-shareholders in pursuit of
shareholder gains. For example, directors can put downward pressure
on wages and benefits for corporate employees. Workers, having
made firm-specific investments of their human capital and having

3. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 28–30 (2008).
4. See id. at 51. There is some academic dispute as to whether contemporary
American corporate law is rightly described as embracing the shareholder primacy norm.
See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS.
REV. 163, 166 (2008) (disputing the view that corporate law requires directors to maximize
shareholder wealth). Here I take as my point of departure the assessment of the most
prominent apologists for the dominant regime, who are quite certain that shareholder
primacy is the order of the day. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, at 53 (“[D]espite
occasional academic arguments to the contrary, the shareholder wealth maximization
norm . . . indisputably is the law in the United States.”).
5. For authoritative elaborations of this canonical account, see generally
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3; FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001).
6. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 16–17.
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made community-specific investments in other areas of their lives,
may find it impossible to punish, or credibly threaten to punish,
directors for such opportunistic conduct by exiting to other firms or
labor markets.7 Corporations can also manipulate the design of their
products or engage in misleading advertising campaigns, distorting
consumers’ risk perceptions or their evaluation of other product
attributes. Because American corporations operate in robust
competitive markets, firms that fail to engage in such opportunistic
conduct will quickly be ground-under by firms that do so. Indeed, the
capital markets will tend to favor firms that even accidentally stumble
into such kinds of practice, as if guided by an invisible hand, even
where no natural-person managers conspire or intend to do so.8
Conventional corporate law scholars are aware of the incentive
that firms have to overreach in their dealings with non-shareholders,
but they are not quick to find that firms successfully do so. Most
corporate scholars employ a basic rational actor conception of
stakeholder behavior. In that model, stakeholders seek to maximize
their privately ordered preferences by rationally evaluating the
myriad options available to them in the marketplace and other
behavioral settings.9 Under the standard account, so long as firms are
operating in competitive markets, they will be forced to provide the
best possible quality of work or goods at the best possible prices,
otherwise workers and consumers will find another nexus with which
to do business.10 With such a framework in place, employment or
consumption decisions are easily viewed as the manifestation of

7. See KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW 50–53 (2006)
(examining worker vulnerabilities under shareholder primacy).
8. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the
Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA.
L. REV. 129, 193–202 (2003) (describing this dynamic as the problem of “power
economics”).
9. For a general overview and critique of the rational actor model, see Jon Hanson &
David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Analysis on the Human
Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 144–52 (2004), which analyzes in particular John Bates Clark
Medal winner David Krep’s explanation and defense of the rational actor; see also Andrea
M. Matwyshyn, Imagining the Intangible, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 965, 990 (2009) (“Corporate
law theory has been dominated by paradigms from law and economics. The discussion
tends to center on wealth maximization by self-interested rational actors . . . .” (citing
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 410–21 (2002);
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 37–39)).
10. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 4 (arguing that corporations
succeed “by promising and delivering what . . . people value”); id. at 38 (“The more
appealing the goods to consumers, the more profit.”).
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personal preferences, and exploitation or manipulation is rarely
seen.11
Nevertheless, if only at the margins, conventional corporate
theory does recognize that because of their relative power, firms can
sometimes overreach with respect to non-shareholders by
manipulating wages, prices, and perceptions. Even where such
problems emerge, however, the standard account insists that the
solution does not reside in altering the shareholder primacy norm at
the heart of firm governance. Instead, firms should be restrained from
engaging in such exploitative conduct by external governmental
regulation, such as labor laws, consumer protection statutes, and
environmental codes.12 The threat of profit-reducing fines or criminal
punishment will ensure compliance with such a regime, thus
protecting non-shareholder interests without undermining the
efficiency of shareholder primacy in firm governance. Whatever the
social problem intersecting with corporate practice, whether it is
443,000 consumers killed each year from tobacco products13 or the
subprime mortgage meltdown and subsequent global economic
collapse, leading corporate law scholars and jurists insist that the
troubles not be considered a failure of corporate governance law
itself, but a failure of external regulation.14
11. See Yosifon, supra note 2, at 258–61.
12. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, at 72 (“[T]argeted legislative approaches are
a preferable solution to the externalities created by corporate conduct. General welfare
laws designed to deter corporate misconduct through criminal and civil sanctions imposed
on the corporation, its directors, and its senior officers are more efficient than
stakeholderist tweaking of director fiduciary duties.”); Michael C. Jensen, Value
Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 7 EUR. FIN.
MGMT. 297, 309 (2001) (“Resolving externality and monopoly problems is the legitimate
domain of the government in its rule-setting function.”).
13. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Smoking-Attributable Mortality, Years of
Potential Life Lost, and Productivity Losses—United States, 2000–2004, 57 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1221, 1226–28 (2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/
PDF/wk/mm5745.pdf; see also Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism
Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1467, 1502–32
(1999) (reviewing studies chronicling consumers’ awareness of the risks of smoking).
14. For a recent example, see Chancellor William Chandler’s opinion dismissing a
recent Citigroup shareholder derivative suit brought in connection with the sub-prime
mortgage crisis:
It is understandable that investors, and others, want to find someone to hold
responsible for these losses, and it is often difficult to distinguish between a desire
to blame someone and a desire to force those responsible to account for their
wrongdoing. Our law, fortunately, provides guidance for precisely these situations
in the form of doctrines governing the duties owed by officers and directors of
Delaware corporations. This law has been refined over hundreds of years, which
no doubt included many crises, and we must not let our desire to blame someone
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This “external regulation” escape hatch is an analytic dead end in
shareholder primacy theory. Because regulation threatens to diminish
profits, and because directors are given the fiduciary obligation to
pursue profits, combating the development and implementation of
regulation becomes an important aspect of the firm’s work.
Regulatory institutions are not immune from the influence of the
firms they are charged with containing on behalf of nonshareholders.15
Of course, firms are not alone in working to influence regulatory
institutions. In the halls of government they encounter the other
stakeholder groups (e.g., workers, consumers, and communities) that
corporate law scholars attest need regulatory protection from
corporate operations. But corporations, in general, enjoy competitive
advantages over consumers and workers in the competition for
regulatory favor. As Mancur Olson explained more than forty years
ago, small groups with narrow interests have a collective action
advantage over broader groups with more diverse interests.16 The
former find it easier to organize, agree on strategies, generate
resources to be deployed in joint activity, and exclude potential freeriders, than do the latter.17 Shareholders, represented by the
corporation, enjoy all of these advantages over workers and
consumers. Corporations, on behalf of shareholders, work alone or in
for our losses make us lose sight of the purpose of our law. Ultimately, the
discretion granted directors and managers allows them to maximize shareholder
value in the long term by taking risks without the debilitating fear that they will be
held personally liable if the company experiences losses. This doctrine also means,
however, that when the company suffers losses, shareholders may not be able to
hold the directors personally liable.
In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 139 (Del. Ch. 2009); see also
Stephen Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967, 970–
72 (2009) (arguing that corporate law was not the cause and does not provide a remedy for
losses associated with the subprime mortgage meltdown).
15. Roberta Romano, a leading proponent of the dominant corporate law paradigm
and author of The Genius of American Corporate Law, acknowledges the prevalence of
this corporate practice: “Casual empiricism supports the contention that corporate PACs
[Political Action Committees] and political expenditures are in fact vehicles for profit
maximization. Corporate PACs . . . tend to be established when there is a substantial
connection between government policies and the maintenance of firm profits.” Roberta
Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 996 (1984).
There is an extensive literature on capture within regulatory and political theory generally,
so robust that it is curious to see the central claims of this literature usually unaddressed
within corporate law scholarship. See, e.g., OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED 42–46
(1996); CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 170–200 (1977); George
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 3 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3–4 (1971).
16. See MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 5–52 (1970).
17. Id. at 22–36.
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consort with trade associations in the regulatory arena. Acting
singularly or together, these firms have one goal: profits.18 Other
stakeholders are widely dispersed and do not have the kind of
focused representation that shareholders enjoy in the firm. While
some workers may enjoy union representation, most do not,19 and
consumers are completely dispersed. Therefore, it is illogical to
expect that “regulation” will be able to contain the excesses of the
shareholder primacy corporation.
Defenders of shareholder primacy in firm governance rarely
address the public choice problem directly, but when they do, they
voice a position similar to that of liberal critics of corporations—they
claim that the proper response to the problem is to insulate the
political and regulatory realms from corporate influence.20 But
conservative and critical corporate scholars have failed to bring
corporate theory together with free speech analysis and have failed to
recognize that the First Amendment, and the values it represents,
forecloses the kind of regulation that would be necessary to insulate
politics from corporate influence and vindicate shareholder primacy.21
18. Some commentators have focused on the extent to which corporate political
activity benefits managers, but “the disciplining power of markets aided by appropriate
incentive contracts restrains managers from consistently engaging in political activities
adverse to shareholder interests.” Romano, supra note 15, at 996.
19. “In 2007, 15.7 million Americans, 12.1 percent of employed wage and salary
workers, belonged to labor unions. This reflects a sharp decline from 1983, when
unionized workers comprised 20.1 percent of the workforce.” Ken Matheny, Catholic
Social Teaching on Labor and Capital: Some Implications for Labor Law, 24 ST. JOHN’S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 1, 1 (2009).
20. Roberta Romano considers restricting the political activity of corporations to be a
“second best” solution to the public choice problem in corporate law, with the first best
solution being redistribution of corporate regulatory rents through tax and transfer:
[A recurring critique of corporate political activity] is based upon a claim that
corporations, representing wealthy individuals, have been able to buy elections
and to shift government policies to their advantage. . . . [E]ven assuming that the
analysis is correct, a simpler solution exists—the direct redistribution of income.
The obvious criticism against such a solution is of a second best sort, that
redistribution is not politically feasible, and therefore indirect approaches like
publicly financing campaigns and lowering spending ceilings are necessary. But
because those alternatives aggravate the incumbency effect, the cure may pose
more severe problems than the supposed disease.
Romano, supra note 15, at 999–1000. Romano does not engage the First Amendment
problems inherent in the restriction of political activity, but focuses instead on the
incumbency effects of corporate patronage. Id. at 1000. Thus, while she recognizes the
public choice problem that I describe here, she offers no solution to it.
21. For example, Jill Fisch likens the shareholder primacy corporation to the
Holmesian bad man who, constrained only by the law, pursues profits for shareholders. Jill
E. Fisch, The “Bad Man” Goes to Washington: The Effect of Political Influence on
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The next sub-section will briefly summarize the ways in which
firms, working on behalf of shareholders, can suppress the operation
of the regulatory institutions that corporate theory depends upon to
protect the interests of non-shareholders.
B.

Regulatory Capture

Corporations can influence the production and administration of
law in many ways. Perhaps the most direct way would be for firms to
purchase influence by paying bribes to policymakers. Such influence
peddling and purchasing is illegal, but it no doubt happens, especially
in domestic or international settings where prohibitions against
bribery are under-enforced.22 Nevertheless, because American
corporate law does not typically protect corporate directors from
personal liability for criminal conduct, even where it is undertaken on
behalf of shareholders, managerial risk-aversion probably dissuades
firms from regularly pursuing patently criminal routes to legislative
influence.23
But finer methods of influence abound. Instead of bribes, firms
and politicians can engage in explicit or implicit quid pro quo
arrangements, in which politicians influence legislation, rule-making,
or enforcement, in exchange for contributions to their campaigns for
political office. Corporations have sought to make donations directly
to political parties,24 which deploy their resources on behalf of specific
candidates. This method of influence is restrained by federal and state
legislation, which limits the amount of direct campaign contributions

Corporate Duty, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1599–1604 (2007). Fisch argues that the
conception of the “Holmesian bad man” constrained only by the law must be complicated
by an understanding that the bad man may “attempt to change the law with which he does
not wish to comply.” Id. at 1610. Fisch then argues that progressive law scholars must look
outside of corporate law and try to ensure that corporations are more constrained from
the political process by external regulatory power. See id. at 1603–04.
22. See generally David C. Weiss, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC
Disgorgement of Profits, and the Evolving International Bribery Regime: Weighing
Proportionality, Retribution, and Deterrence, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471 (2009) (discussing
the SEC’s increasing use of disgorgement as a tool to enforce the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act).
23. See generally Norwood P. Beveridge, Does the Corporate Director Have a Duty
Always to Obey the Law?, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 729 (1996) (answering yes, for the most
part).
24. Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Breaching a Leaking Dam?: Corporate Money and
Elections, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 91, 92–110 (2009) (summarizing means through which
corporations have endeavored to influence politics, including donations to political
parties).
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that corporations can make,25 but such restrictions are easily evaded
by firms funneling money to independent organizations which
themselves make contributions to political parties and specific
candidates.26 In addition, campaign contribution limits do not reach
explicit or implicit agreements whereby firms make “donations” from
the corporate treasury to the politician’s favorite charitable
institutions, in exchange for favorable legislative consideration. As
long as such arrangements are implicit, they are limited only by
corporate law restrictions on charitable giving, which are quite lax.27
Finally, after Citizens United, which will be discussed infra,28
corporations are free to expend unlimited resources from their
corporate treasuries in support of a candidate who is favorable to
their regulatory needs.
Bribes, contributions, and expenditures are not the only way that
corporations influence the regulatory process. In fact, they may turn
out to be less important than other methods. Like most human
beings, politicians like to view themselves in affirming ways, as hardworking, competent, principled, and effective.29 Effectuating
regulatory policies merely for cash payments, or to maintain the
salaries and trappings of office, would surely give rise to
unmanageable cognitive dissonance for most politicians, unless they
could also plausibly believe that the regulatory regimes they support
are not just useful to their corporate patrons, but also sound public
policy. In the sardonic tones of Stephen Bainbridge, “Any sensible
theory of the relationship between politics and corporate governance
thus must consider not only naked self-interest, but also the
possibility that ideology matters, even in the halls of Congress.”30 In
the same tongue-in-cheek manner, Mark Roe has opined that
“sometimes the public-policy players have enough slack to be able to

25. See Gregg D. Polsky & Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Regulating Section 527
Organizations, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1000, 1001–02 (2005).
26. See id. (emphasizing the ease with which individuals and organizations are able to
evade campaign contribution limits by giving money to nominally independent political
organizations rather than candidates).
27. See generally Jill E. Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Story,
58 VAND. L. REV. 1495 (2005) (reviewing various methods corporations deploy to
influence regulatory processes at the local, state, and federal levels).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 83–95.
29. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 9, at 94–106 (reviewing social science that
demonstrates widespread, powerful motives that humans have to view themselves and the
groups with which they are associated in an affirming, approving fashion).
30. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 671, 689 (1995).
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act on their ideological preferences.”31 All parties in the problematic
system may be operating in good faith, with proper motives, in
dignified fashion. The public choice problem that I am focusing on
here is a problem in the dynamics of influence. It does not rely on any
malicious, smoke-filled-room notion of corruption.32
A most important arena in which the competition for regulatory
favor takes place, then, is inside the mind of the policymaker. One of
the crucial ways that firms gain an advantage in this competition is by
employing professional lobbyists who have the knowledge,
experience, and persuasive skills to make the corporate case to
politicians.33 Without the organizational advantage of the firm, other
stakeholders—and consumers in particular—cannot produce the
same kind of systematic, personalized lobbying efforts that firms can
deploy on behalf of their shareholders.34 It is surely a lot easier for a
politician to support a proposal that advances the interests of a firm
that supports her tenure in office when she also has reason to believe
that the proposal constitutes sound policy.
In this competition over what constitutes sound public policy in
the minds of politicians, corporations also benefit from the nearly
universal cognitive bias that social psychologists refer to as the
“fundamental attribution error,” or the problem of dispositionism.35
We humans tend to view our own and other people’s behavior as
being caused by and reflecting privately held preferences, values,
31. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2503 (2005).
32. Many discussions of corporate influence in government lose credibility when they
make the unwarranted leap from influence to malevolent or selfish purpose, or corruption.
See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 965 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring and
dissenting) (“The unparalleled resources, professional lobbyists, and single minded focus
[corporations] bring to this effort, I believe, make quid pro quo corruption and its
appearance inherently more likely when they (or their conduits or trade groups) spend
unrestricted sums on elections.”). These arguments lack credibility especially among
politicians and business persons who see themselves and their cohort as fair-minded, hardworking, ethically upstanding folks in whose communities the rare abjectly corrupt person
is despised and considered an outcast just as they are in any other part of society. See
Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 9, at 90–106 (discussing self, group, and system affirmation
motives).
33. See generally Fisch, supra note 27 (emphasizing the role that knowledge and
expertise on the part of professional lobbyists plays in the development of regulations that
are favorable to corporate enterprise); Steven Brill, On Sale: Your Government. Why
Lobbying Is Washington’s Best Bargain, TIME, July 12, 2010, at 28–35 (discussing
politicians’ reliance on information provided by corporate lobbyists when developing
regulatory policy).
34. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 966 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting)
(“[C]orporations with large war chests to deploy on electioneering may find
democratically elected bodies becoming much more attuned to their interests.”).
35. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 9, at 6–9, 22–34.
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desires, and interests.36 This basic picture of human behavior is
echoed in formal and informal versions of the “rational actor” model
that animate a great deal of legal scholarship, and corporate theory in
particular.37 Social psychologists call this cognitive baseline
dispositionism because it is an outlook that overstates the influence of
individual disposition in accounting for human behavior and misses
the crucial role of situation, or behavioral context, in shaping human
thoughts, preferences, choices, and conduct.38 In their marketing and
promotional activity, corporations betray a keen understanding of the
situational nature of human behavior and a willingness to exploit it.39
In their lobbying efforts, however, corporations regularly promote the
dispositionist conception of human behavior that policymakers, being

36. Id.
37. See id. at 8–20, 138–70.
38. See id.
39. Examples of this kind of manipulation abound. It was seen where cigarette
manufacturers cultivated strains of tobacco with higher levels of nicotine, the addictive
compound in cigarettes, which influenced the conduct of smokers in ways that were
opaque to their conscious awareness. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking
Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV.
1420, 1475–78 (1999). It is seen also in the promotional practice of retail “junk food”
(defined as “[a]ny of various prepackaged snack foods high in calories but low in
nutritional value,” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 440
(1995)). Walking through any mall, one inevitably encounters the wafting smells and
calculated visual display of junk food. The human eating system, unbeknownst to our
conscious understanding, triggers the subjective experience of hunger not only when our
bodies need energy to complete present life tasks, but also when the body anticipates
eating or when we are in the presence of food. See David G. Yosifon, Legal Theoretic
Inadequacy and Obesity Epidemic Analysis, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 681, 686 (2008). The
mechanics of this system evolved over the eons of human history in which they provided a
survival advantage, given that food scarcity and famine was then a chronic condition. Id. at
686–87. Then and now, however, when the situation induces within us the experience of
hunger, we subjectively conclude that we need to eat now, and when we then patronize the
salty, fatty foods in our midst we interpret the firms we buy from as having satisfied
preferences we brought to them, rather than preferences they induced. Id. Other kinds of
situational manipulation involve the use of advertising to, among other things, lower the
risk assessments that consumers make regarding specific products. Social psychologists
have well documented, for example, that in most informal settings humans make
probability assessments not through any formal actuarial analysis, but based instead on the
ease with which images or associations of an outcome emerges in the mind. See generally
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and
Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973) (presenting seminal studies identifying
this cognitive phenomena). What comes to mind is often a function of what is in the
situation when we make our assessments. In light of this cognitive dynamic, it should not
be surprising that junk food advertising ubiquitously associates the consumption of junk
food with health and happiness, sexual virility, and magic, and that consumers
dramatically underestimate the adverse health risks associated with the regular
consumption of these foods. Yosifon, supra, at 687.
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human, are already primed to see.40 It is this conception of human
behavior which tends to view employee or consumer behavior as the
manifestation of individual choice, rather than the result of situational
manipulation.41 And it is this view which suggests that contracts—
privately ordered choices—are sufficient to protect the interests of
non-shareholders in the corporate nexus, with no need for intrusive
regulation.42 In the regulatory competition over the conception of
human agency, then, the playing field is not level. Humans begin with
a dispositionist baseline, and firms work to promote and deepen it.43
40. See Adam Benforado et al., Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America, 53
EMORY L.J. 1645, 1769–1801 (2004) (reviewing dispositionism in policymaking generally
and with respect to the regulatory response to the obesity epidemic in particular).
41. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 8, at 225–29.
42. See id.
43. Cf. Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of
Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 46 (1988) (“[Public choice theory] implies not
only that certain sorts of groups are more effective in obtaining desirable legislation, but
also that certain sorts of issues will be most attractive to entrepreneurial politicians.”). The
modern literature on public choice places great emphasis on the politician as
entrepreneur. Id. (“[C]ontrary to popular belief, the public choice model is, in fact,
inconsistent with the rather primitive ‘capture theory’ of economic regulation which posits
that one particular interest group rather than a group of interest groups drives legislation
or regulation.”); see FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT
EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION 41 (1997); Fred S. McChesney, Rent
Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD.
101, 102 (1987). Politicians do not just serve the most powerful interests, but rather they
manufacture support by finding individuals and groups suffering from collective action
problems and promising to help them achieve unified action. This view does not deny that
corporations are likely to engage in “socially undesirable rent seeking,” but it simply
stresses that “legislators, as sellers, play as active a role in the market for legislation as
potential buyers such as corporations.” Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech,
Political Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103,
1135 (2002). Modern public choice theory also suggests that politicians are likely to
balance the interests of their non-corporate and corporate constituents by supporting
ostensibly anti-corporate legislative programs that provide a salient but superficial salve to
non-corporate agitators, while substantively serving corporate interests. MCCHESNEY,
supra, at 140–41. Campaign finance legislation, for example, has consistently followed this
pattern since it first emerged in the early twentieth century—broad public
pronouncements and salient new regulations, followed by porous enforcement and the
development of numerous loopholes. Sitkoff, supra, at 1136. Some scholars point to the
existence of profit-restricting legislation as evidence against the public choice problem I
am emphasizing. See Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What’s Good for
General Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 235, 247–48 (1988) (arguing that the New Deal, Great Society programs, federal
regulation of tobacco and pharmaceuticals, and the failure to enact tort reform
demonstrate that “large corporate interests have not always had their way in the political
process”). Such legislation, however, only evidences that there is indeed a competition for
regulatory favor. It does not show that corporations are not generally favored over other
groups in that competition. Further, where corporate interests do suffer in regulatory
completion, it is typically at the hands of other organized groups, most notably organized
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The public choice problem I am emphasizing here has received
scant attention in leading corporate law scholarship. In his recent
book-length apologia The New Corporate Governance in Theory and
Practice, Stephen Bainbridge actually argues that non-shareholding
stakeholders have an advantage over shareholders in regulatory
competition:
Let us assume . . . that nonshareholder constituencies are
unable to protect themselves through contract. The right rule
would still be director fiduciary duties incorporating the
shareholder wealth maximization norm. Many nonshareholder
constituencies have substantial power to protect themselves
through the political process. . . . Absent a few self-appointed
spokesmen [or women], most of whom are either gadflies or
promoting some service they sell, shareholders—especially
individuals—have no meaningful political voice. In contrast,
many nonshareholder constituencies are represented by
cohesive, politically powerful interest groups.44
This is clearly wrong. Shareholders presently have the
magnificently cohesive, relentless, well-funded, and articulate voice of
the corporation acting as their political voice. The only nonshareholding group that Bainbridge specifies as having “meaningful
political voice” are workers through labor unions, which he
acknowledges do not protect non-union workers, but which is not
troubling to him because “[v]arious market mechanisms have evolved
to protect employee investments in firm-specific human capital.”45
This retreat to the power of the market to protect non-union workers
is an odd move in an inquiry that promised, pace the block quote
above, to assume that “nonshareholder constituencies are unable to
protect themselves through contract.”46 Bainbridge has nothing to say
about how shareholder primacy theory expects consumers or other
stakeholders to overcome their collective action problems in the
regulatory arena where they will face in every corner the elephant of
the shareholder primacy lobby, which proponents of the dominant
paradigm appear not to see.

labor—regulatory legislation serving such groups may leave consumers no better off, or
even worse off, than they are under corporate domination. Finally, even if neither
corporations nor labor are able to capture the regulatory agenda, that agenda may be
driven by the ideological interests of individual politicians or political parties. The
consumer remains in each case an unorganized and ineffective political force.
44. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, at 71.
45. Id. at 72.
46. Id. at 71.
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Capture of Corporate Law

Corporate law is often described as essentially “enabling” in that
it allows parties to contract out of specified arrangements,47 but this
“enabling” ideology both understates what corporate law does and
exaggerates what corporate law makes possible. There is stickiness to
the default once it is prescribed. Even if corporate law is theoretically
mutable, most parties to the corporate contract encounter severe
collective action problems which preclude the realization of
alternative arrangements.48 Non-shareholding stakeholders are
therefore largely stuck with shareholder primacy in firm governance,
unless corporate law prescribes some other default.49
If the default rules are largely determinative, then it is important
to assess how the defaults are determined. Corporate charters are
provided, in exchange for a franchise fee, by state governments.
Competition for investors forces firms to incorporate in states that
provide a body of corporate law which is most advantageous to
shareholders.50 The dominant purveyor of corporate law is the state of
47. See, e.g., Harry G. Hutchison, Choice, Progressive Values, and Corporate Law: A
Reply to Greenfield, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 437, 449 (2010) (“Corporate law furnishes ‘offthe-rack’ rules that are primarily enabling (rather than prescriptive) and which allow the
parties to easily negotiate around them.”); Roberta Romano, Is Regulatory Competition a
Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate Governance?, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 212,
216 (2005) (“State corporate law is in essence enabling, following a menu approach that
permits firms to alter statutory defaults to fit their needs.”); see also Bernard S. Black, Is
Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 545–
46 (1990) (analyzing the tension between enabling and mandatory elements in American
corporate law).
48. See OLSON, supra note 16, at 5–52.
49. For an excellent example of the infelicitous operation of the status quo bias and
endowment effects, consider the following insightful study on the structure of employee
compensation. James Choi and his co-authors found that where employment
compensation defaults prescribe all cash salaries with an option to mute the default and
take instead a mix of cash and retirement benefits, roughly eighty percent of employees
stuck with all cash salaries. See James J. Choi et al., Defined Contribution Pensions: Plan
Rules, Participant Choices, and the Path of Least Resistance, 16 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 67,
79–80 (2002). However, where the default is a mix of cash and retirement benefits, with an
option to mute the default and take all cash instead, around eighty percent stuck with the
mix of cash and retirement benefits. Id. The study well demonstrates, in a non-trivial
setting, the power of default rules. It is widely believed that workers are better off with a
mix of cash and retirement planning than with cash alone. See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard
H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1159–60
(2003) (discussing the Choi study and similar studies). Some policymakers thus take from
the Choi study the lesson that employers should establish a mix of cash and savings as the
compensation default. See, e.g., id.; see also Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 9, at 39–44
(discussing endowment effects and framing effects); Yosifon, supra note 39, at 695–713
(critiquing Sunstein and Thaler).
50. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, at 12–14, 36.
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Delaware. Mark Roe argues that “the first effect of the franchise tax
is not just to affect who wins between managers and shareholders, nor
just to bond Delaware to try hard to make good corporate law, but
also to decide who gets to play. Managers and shareholders get to
play; no one else does.”51 Non-shareholding stakeholders have a
particularly hard time being heard in Delaware, which has no
significant labor base or interest group presence, especially as
compared to what would be seen in Washington, D.C., if corporations
were federally chartered.52 No jurisdiction or law-producing body has
developed an institutional expertise, a tradition, a set of norms, or an
occasion of regulatory attention for consumers or labor, that can
match what shareholders enjoy in Delaware. Indeed, in Delaware it
appears as if there is something going on that looks a lot like a real
version of the nexus-of-contract theory’s hypothetical conference
room.53 Delaware is a real corporate law conference room (or state)
from which non-shareholding stakeholders individually and as a
group are absent.54
II. FIRST AMENDMENT IMPEDIMENTS TO SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY
Corporate law discourse typically ignores the public choice
problem that I have described here. Where scholars do address the
problem directly, they tend to assume that a plausible solution would
be to insulate regulatory institutions from corporate influence by
restricting corporate political activity. For example, Robert Reich, an
economist and former secretary of labor in the Clinton
administration, argues that corporations should give up on political
activity altogether, or be made to:

51. Roe, supra note 31, at 2500.
52. Because of the status quo bias, anchoring effects, framing effects, and institutional
inertia, it is difficult for Congress to dislodge the presumptions that are established in
Delaware. Further, while shareholders and managers are exclusively present in Delaware,
they are also present, independently or collectively in the form of the corporation, in
Washington, D.C., where they can exercise influence to forestall any overturning of the
mutually beneficial compromise established in Delaware. See id. at 2517 (“Only when
overwhelming force—a major scandal or economic reversal—seriously (and usually
temporarily) empowers either the productivity-oriented policymakers or the populists, or
both, do the federal authorities act.”).
53. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, at 51.
54. See Roe, supra note 31, at 2512 (“It’s as if Delaware gave managers and investors
the means to caucus quickly and set a status quo.”); id. at 2537 (“Investors, managers, and
their lawyers are represented on the bar association’s corporate committees; and
Delaware’s corporate law is itself a quasi-contract between managers and shareholders
that is written by the two and enforced by the legislature.”).
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Companies have no independent moral or legal authority to use
their resources to influence the creation of laws defining their
responsibilities to stakeholders other than investors. Society has
ceded to them only the responsibility for maximizing investor
returns, on the premise that in doing so they will spur growth
and improve allocative efficiency. . . . The meta-social
responsibility of the corporation, then, is to respect the political
process by staying out of it. . . . Should not government enforce
this meta-responsibility by passing laws and rules which
constrain corporate political activity?55
Arguments for the restriction of corporate political activity from
the corporate law perspective have, however, usually failed to address
doctrinal or normative limitations that free speech protections place
on such restrictions. This Part briefly describes the developments of
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on corporate political speech,
culminating in the recent decision in Citizens United. This Part then
examines normative arguments for and against limiting corporate
political speech irrespective of what the Supreme Court has said.56
This Part concludes with an examination of the limited practicality of
regulating corporate political activity, regardless of the doctrinal or
normative legitimacy of such restrictions.57
A. Getting to Citizens United
In a landmark article in defense of corporate political speech a
decade ago, Martin Redish and Howard Wasserman lamented that
“the modern trend appears unmistakably away from extending fullfledged constitutional protection to corporate speech.”58 Ten years

55. Robert B. Reich, The New Meaning of Corporate Social Responsibility, CAL.
MGMT. REV., Winter 1998, at 8, 16–17.
56. My treatment here is limited to an analysis of the viability of various arguments in
favor or against the regulation of corporate political activity. I use Citizens United as a
guide to my discussion, but my arguments are both more extensive and more limited than
what was at stake in that case. I consider broad justifications for the regulation of
corporate political activity which were not directly or extensively dealt with in the case; on
the other hand, I do not parse with delicacy the intricacies of the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act (BCRA) regulatory scheme, nor do I parse the labyrinthine questions of how
well or poorly Citizens United fits with the Court’s previous First Amendment caselaw or
how well the Court’s work stands up against the principles of stare decisis. For in-depth
analysis of Citizens United with special attention to the Court’s precedents on corporate
speech, see generally Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109
MICH. L. REV. 581 (2011).
57. See infra Part II.D.
58. Redish & Wasserman, supra note 43, at 238.
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ago few would have disagreed with them, but ten years later, the
Supreme Court has proved them wrong.
The modern jurisprudence on corporate political speech begins
in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978),59 which struck
down on First Amendment grounds (5-4) a Massachusetts statute
forbidding business corporations from making campaign expenditures
in referendum elections not “materially affecting any of the property,
business or assets of the corporation.”60 The statute stipulated that
referenda on personal income tax rates did not materially affect the
operation of business corporations or banks (income tax referenda
were in play in Massachusetts when the statute was passed).61 The
Bellotti Court did not base its holding on a conclusion about whether
or not corporations “have” First Amendment rights.62 Instead, the
Court focused on the nature of the speech that the statute sought to
forbid and concluded that it was the kind of speech—political speech
on matters of public importance—that the First Amendment was
intended to protect.63 Because citizens had a right to, and an interest
in, hearing speech about public referenda, corporate speech on such
matters could not be forbidden.64
In 1986 in Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens
for Life (MCFL),65 the Court (the whole Court, 9-0) struck down, as
applied to non-profit corporations, a federal statute that tried to
forbid corporate expenditures in connection with any federal election.
MCFL was a non-profit corporation dedicated to opposing abortion
through political advocacy. The Court focused on the fact that MCFL
was not a business entity66: “Some corporations have features more
akin to voluntary political associations than business firms, and
therefore should not have to bear burdens on independent spending
solely because of their incorporated status.”67 The MCFL Court ruled
only that the statute at issue could not be applied to non-business
associations formed for the purpose of engaging in political activity,
and which did not accept contributions from business enterprises.68
59. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
60. Id. at 768. Corporate expenditures in opposition to previous tax hike referenda
had spurred the speech prohibition at issue in the case. Id. at 769.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 775–76.
63. Id. at 776.
64. Id.
65. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
66. Id. at 263.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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Four years later in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of
Commerce,69 the Court (6-3) made good on the distinction it presaged
in MCFL when it let stand a state statute forbidding corporations
from spending money from the corporate treasury “in support of, or
in opposition to, any candidate in elections for state office.”70 The
statute did allow the use of segregated funds that were comprised of
contributions by executives or individual stockholders, but the
corporation could not spend its own money on campaigns.71 Justice
Thurgood Marshall wrote for the majority that it was permissible for
states to regulate corporate speech in the interest of stemming “the
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth
that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that
have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the
corporation’s political ideas.”72 Like MCFL,73 the Michigan Chamber
of Commerce was a non-profit corporation, but unlike MCFL, it was
funded by for-profit corporations and was primarily concerned with
advancing the business prospects of its members.74 Whatever one
thinks of the merits of the cases, it seems clear that Austin was at least
in tension with Bellotti, although the two could be distinguished on
the grounds that Bellotti only addressed corporate speech on
referendum campaigns, while Austin dealt with corporate speech on
behalf of or against specific candidates for office.75
In 2002 Congress enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
(BCRA) (also known as the McCain-Feingold law), which, inter alia,
forbade corporations (both for-profit and non-profit) and labor
unions from making expenditures or broadcasting ads in support of or
against specific candidates for political office within thirty days of a
primary election or sixty days of a general election.76 The legislation
did not limit campaign expenditures by natural persons.77
In 2007, in another 5-4 ruling, the Court in Federal Election
Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL)78 turned to
69. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
70. Id. at 654.
71. Id. at 655. On the limited viability of the segregated-fund gambit, see infra note
95.
72. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
73. See supra text accompanying note 66.
74. Austin, 494 U.S. at 656.
75. Id. at 654; First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978).
76. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, §§ 201, 203, 116
Stat. 81, 88–89, 91 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 434(f)(3)(A), 441b(b)(2) (2006)), invalidated by
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
77. § 203(c)(2), 116 Stat. at 91.
78. 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
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BCRA’s expenditure prohibition and held that while it was
permissible for Congress to limit corporate expenditures expressly
advocating a specific candidate, the First Amendment protected
expenditures discussing, supporting, or opposing an “issue” that
might be at stake in a given campaign for a specific office.79 The Court
upheld BCRA by reading the legislation to prohibit only
expenditures which used “magic words” of express advocacy or
opposition to a specific candidate, or words that were the functional
equivalent of such express advocacy.80 Chief Justice Roberts
summarized the Court’s opinion as holding that the BRCA forbade
only speech that is “susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other
than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.”81
Extending the baseball cant he showcased in his “calling balls and
strikes” explanation of judicial decision-making during his Senate
confirmation hearings, Roberts wrote that when construing whether
speech was express advocacy or not, “a tie goes to the speaker.”82
In September of 2009 the Supreme Court reviewed the BCRA
again in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.83 Citizens
United was a non-profit corporation that was funded in part by forprofit corporations.84 The case concerned a feature-length film that
the organization produced called Hillary: The Movie, which was
critical of the political career of Hillary Rodham Clinton, who was

79. Id. at 470 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
80. WRTL, 551 U.S. at 469–70. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence:
The Roberts Court’s Deregulatory Turn in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 MINN. L.
REV. 1064 (2008) (critiquing the Roberts Court’s emerging jurisprudence on campaign
finance regulation).
81. WRTL, 551 U.S. at 470. Hasen predicted at the time that “[t]he new test will not
pose a formidable obstacle for those corporations and unions that wish to run ads to
influence elections, though it could potentially deter some spending on the most personal
of attack ads. As a result, a significant rise in corporate election-related spending may
occur.” Hasen, supra note 80, at 1066.
82. WRTL, 551 U.S. at 474 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); see Douglas E. Abrams, Sports
in the Courts: The Role of Sports References in Judicial Opinions, 17 VILL. SPORTS & ENT.
L.J. 1, 45 & n.241 (2010) (discussing Roberts’s “balls and strikes” comments). In baseball a
“tie goes to the runner” when the ball and the runner reach the base at the same time.
Although every sandlot baseball or backyard wiffle ball player knows this rule, it is
actually a common law rule in baseball, as it appears nowhere in the game’s official
rulebook, which does not address the situation of “ties.” See Steve Gilbert, Baseball
Rulebook Not Short on Nuance, MLB.COM (Nov. 16, 2006), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/
article.jsp?ymd=20061117&content_id=1742331&vkey=news_ari&fext=.jsp&c_id=mlb.
With this example in mind, the judge-as-umpire analogy should be of limited comfort to
those who would have judges merely apply the law as written.
83. 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010).
84. Id. at 886–87.
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then a senator of New York.85 Citizens United wanted to show its film
in theaters and make it available “on-demand” through cable
television within thirty days of a primary election in which Senator
Clinton was running to become the Democratic Party’s candidate for
president.86 Fearing that their plans would leave them vulnerable to
civil and criminal penalties under BCRA, Citizens United sought a
declaratory judgment that BCRA could not legally be applied to
them.87 A three-judge district court panel held that the content of the
film was susceptible to no reasonable interpretation other than as
opposition to Clinton’s candidacy, and thus, under the teaching of
WRTL, was subject to BCRA’s restrictions.88
The Supreme Court first heard oral arguments in Citizens United
in March of 2009 which focused on an “as applied” challenge to
BCRA.89 In June the Court shocked the legal world by requesting
additional briefing and a new oral argument on whether the Court
should address the broader question of the facial constitutional
legitimacy of the statute.90 The Court itself answered this question in
the affirmative when its decision finally came down in January of
2010. In a 5-4 ruling, the Court overruled Austin and held that the
First Amendment forbids Congress from limiting independent
expenditures by both non-profit and for-profit corporations in
connection with campaigns for political office.91
One of the truly remarkable aspects of the Citizens United
opinion is the absence of any critical inquiry by the Court into what a
“corporation” is. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy
and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito, took as its point of departure the idea that the First
Amendment forbids Congress from regulating political speech based
on the identity of the speaker, be that speaker a single natural person,

85. Id. at 887.
86. Id. at 887–88.
87. Id. at 888.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court Gets Ready to Turn on the Corporate
Fundraising Spigot, SLATE (June 29, 2009), http://www.slate.com/id/2221753/ (“In a
Supreme Court term that has had its share of surprises, the court saved one of the biggest
for last. Rather than publish an opinion at the end of the term as expected in an obscure
campaign finance case, Citizens United v. FEC, the court issued a rare order for
reargument of the case in September . . . [when] the court will consider whether to
overrule its two previous decisions that . . . upheld limits on corporate spending in federal
elections.”).
91. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
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or an association comprised of many persons.92 “The Court has . . .
rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or other
associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment
simply because such associations are not ‘natural persons.’ ”93
Individuals have First Amendment rights to associative speech, and
that speech cannot be abridged based on the nature of the
association; therefore, it was not necessary for the Court to examine
the nature of the corporate association.94
Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion similarly glosses over the
question of what a corporation is, assuming both that it is obvious and
that it is irrelevant. Citizens United is bereft of any citation to
corporate theory until, seventy-six pages into his dissent, Justice
Stevens drops a footnote assuring us that corporate theory is
irrelevant to his view that corporate political speech can be regulated:
Nothing in this analysis turns on whether the corporation is
conceptualized as a grantee of a state concession, see, e.g.,
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 636
(1819) (Marshall, C. J.), a nexus of explicit and implicit
contracts, see, e.g., F. Easterbrook & D. Fischel, The Economic
Structure of Corporate Law 12 (1991), a mediated hierarchy of
stakeholders, see, e.g., Blair & Stout, A Team Production
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 Va. L. Rev. 247 (1999)
(hereinafter Blair & Stout), or any other recognized model. . . .
It is not necessary to agree on a precise theory of the
corporation to agree that corporations differ from natural
persons in fundamental ways, and that a legislature might
therefore need to regulate them differently if it is human
welfare that is the object of its concern. Cf. Hansmann &
Kraakman[, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 Geo. L.
J. 439 (2001)] 441, n.5.95

92. Id. at 900.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 898–99, 913.
95. Id. at 971–72 n.72 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). Stevens claims that his
arguments are applicable no matter what conception of the corporation one embraces. See
id. But it is clear through much of his dissent that Stevens does have in mind a particular
conception of the corporation, and that many of his arguments depend upon the
conception he is deploying. For example, he insists that corporations are not “banned”
from engaging in political speech because they may make use of Political Action
Committees (PACs), which he insists “provide corporations . . . with a constitutionally
sufficient opportunity to engage in express advocacy.” Id. at 942 (quoting McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 203 (2003), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876). But corporate
PACs can only solicit donations from shareholders, executives, and their families. See 11
C.F.R. 114.5(g)(1) (2010) (corporate PAC regulations). The only way that this is even
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For Stevens in dissent, it is unnecessary to delve into the nature
of what a corporation is—so long as its structure, wealth, and power
threatens to distort or corrupt well-functioning political discourse,
Congress has the power to regulate it.
Corporate law is thus wholly irrelevant both to the majority and
the dissent in Citizens United. Nevertheless, since Citizens United
stands for the proposition that government cannot insulate the
political arena from the influence of corporations, Citizens United will
prove quite relevant indeed to corporate law, or at least to normative
corporate theory. Before turning to these corporate law implications,
the following sub-sections will take a deeper look at arguments for
and against the restriction of corporate political activity. The purpose
of this inquiry is to help determine whether shareholder primacy is
theoretically coherent because it does make sense to allow
government to restrict corporate political activity, in which case what
we have is merely a bad Supreme Court holding in Citizens United, or
whether shareholder primacy is not even theoretically sound because
its command for government restriction of corporate political activity
is truly irreconcilable with free speech values.
B.

Tempting-But-Ultimately-Bad Arguments for Regulating
Corporate Political Speech
1. The State-Conferred Benefits Argument

Perhaps the most commonly heard justification for why
corporate political speech can be restricted is that corporations are
artificial creatures of law, bestowed with favorable attributes by the
state, and can therefore be subject to regulation by the governments
that created them and made them powerful in the first place.96

arguably a sufficient mechanism through which corporations can engage in expressive
advocacy is if you consider the corporation to be an association of shareholders, or
shareholders and high level executives. But the idea that corporations are the property of
shareholders, or merely an association of shareholders, is completely rejected in modern
theories of the corporation, which conceive of the corporation as a nexus of voluntary
associations comprised of shareholders, creditors, workers, consumers, and communities.
See supra text accompanying notes 3–4.
96. See, e.g., J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First
Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 641 (1982). Austin
itself embraced the state-conferred benefits justification. See Austin v. Mich. State
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659–60 (1990) (“Michigan’s regulation aims at a
different type of corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form
and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political
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For starters, note that this argument flies in the face of
contemporary theories of the firm, which posit that the corporation is
not an entity created by the state, but is rather a voluntary association
of individuals, a nexus-of-contracts.97 Still, let us assume that
government does bestow concessions upon corporations in the sense
of providing default rules, including limited liability to shareholders
for both contract and tort creditors, and recognizing the indefinite life
of firms with an ability to buy, hold, and sell property. A stateconferred benefits justification for restricting corporate political
speech still cannot withstand scrutiny because it would open the door
to a host of other speech regulation that would surely be
incommensurate with First Amendment values, if the First
Amendment is to mean anything at all. As Redish and Wasserman
argued in their touchstone defense of corporate free speech:
It is true . . . that corporations possess a number of statutorily
granted economic advantages that may enable corporations to
have a competitive edge over other speakers. . . . Similarly,
inheritance laws ensure that heirs of large estates will retain
most of the estate’s corpus, capital gains laws economically
benefit successful investors, and patent laws give investors
artificially created monopolies, thereby effectively providing all
three groups with potential economic advantages in the
expressive marketplace if they choose to exercise them. . . . No
one, to our knowledge, has seriously suggested that the
expressive activity of these individuals or organizations can
constitutionally be curbed as a result of their potential
economic advantages.98
One might add to Redish and Wasserman’s list the governmentconferred benefits of individual bankruptcy, the use of the roads, the
protection of the police, or the availability of courts to redress private
and public grievances. Few would argue that because the state confers
these advantages on natural persons the government should be able
to regulate individuals’ political speech, or that the government could
condition these benefits on an individuals’ willingness to subject their
political speech to government regulation.
Moreover, many media entities are organized as corporations.
For example, the New York Times, CNN (a subsidiary of TimeWarner, Inc.), and Fox News (News Corp.) are all publicly traded
ideas.”). Curiously, the majority in Citizens United did not directly address the stateconferred benefits argument.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 3–4.
98. Redish & Wasserman, supra note 43, at 284–85 (footnote omitted).
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corporations. The government-conferred advantage argument would
allow the state to regulate the political speech of the New York Times
and like entities.99 Even political organizations, such as the NAACP,
NOW, and the NRA, are organized as non-profit corporations and
enjoy state-conferred benefits, including limited liability to members
for the debts of their organizations, the right to hold and sell
property, and tax advantages. It would be a very small version—an
unfamiliar version—of the First Amendment that would sanction the
regulation of the media and political organizations on the grounds
that they enjoy the benefits of state-conferred corporate status.100
In short, if one is unwilling to allow government to regulate the
speech of individuals and non-profit associations that benefit from
state-conferred advantages,101 then some other principle must be
found for justifying the regulation of corporate political speech.

99. The BCRA purported to exempt “media corporations,” a restraint the Court
found unavailing. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 905. I am not here tracking the particulars
of the BCRA statute or the Citizens United opinion, but am reviewing the cogency of
arguments for and against corporate political speech regulation generally.
100. One might argue that there is a special protection for “the press” in our
constitutional “scaffolding,” but the Court has rejected this view doctrinally, id., and
conceptually the argument provides no way to distinguish regulation of corporate “press”
speech from other kinds of corporate speech in the era of conglomerate news and
entertainment industries, and the proliferation of widespread gonzo journalism through
the Internet.
101. If one were willing to grant speech rights only to individuals and not to
associations, then that would provide a way of restricting corporate political speech. But
that would be a very narrow view of free speech rights, one which few would countenance.
As Justice Scalia put it in his Citizens United concurrence:
All the provisions of the Bill of Rights set forth the rights of individual men and
women—not, for example, of trees or polar bears. But the individual person’s right
to speak includes the right to speak in association with other individual persons.
Surely the dissent does not believe that speech by the Republican Party or the
Democratic Party can be censored because it is not the speech of “an individual
American.” It is the speech of many individual Americans, who have associated in
a common cause, giving the leadership of the party the right to speak on their
behalf. The association of individuals in a business corporation is no different—or
at least it cannot be denied the right to speak on the simplistic ground that it is not
“an individual American.”
Id. at 928 (Scalia, J., concurring). Political action at the organization level is important
because it can avoid the free-rider problem besetting individual action, i.e., the
mismatching of individual costs and benefits arising as a consequence of the fact that the
objects of politics are often public goods. When a group undertakes political activity, the
costs, as well as benefits, are shared proportionately by all members, and the optimal level
of action can be achieved. Critics of free speech for corporations would withhold these
important organizational advantages from corporate associates. See Redish & Wasserman,
supra note 43, at 237 (“One should view corporate speech, then, as a form of indirect or
catalytic self-realization, no less valuable than the more obvious and direct modes of self-
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2. The Distortion Argument
One of the arguments for the regulation of corporate political
speech that was countenanced in Austin and rejected by the Court in
Citizens United is the “anti-distortion” justification.102 The antidistortion argument can be understood as a variation on the “stateconferred benefit” justification. The anti-distortion argument insists
that corporations, by virtue of their legal status and structure, are
capable of deploying resources in support of their political positions
with a force that projects into political discourse an impression of
support for its views that is greater than the actual sum of support for
those positions among natural persons in the voting public as a
whole.103 The disparity between the prominence of the corporation’s
expressed views and actual support for such views among the people
distorts political discourse, elections, and governance.
This is a bad argument for a number of reasons. First, it is hard to
see, at least from the perspective of shareholder primacy theory, how
a corporation’s political speech does not accurately reflect support for
the views it expresses. Corporate law requires firms to pursue
shareholder value. In contemporary capital markets, shareholders can
enter and exit firms with the click of a mouse. They invest in firms
precisely because they believe that directors will be able to
accomplish shareholder goals more capably than the shareholders
could if they maintained control of their capital.104 Sometimes that
directorial accomplishment takes the form of giving the green light to
development, and thus fully consistent with the purposes served by the constitutional
protection of speech.”).
102. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908 (majority opinion). Apparently grasping the
implausibly of the anti-distortion argument, the government argued for keeping Austin’s
holding alive but did not rely on the anti-distortion rationale on which Austin rested. “For
the most part relinquishing the antidistortion rationale, the Government falls back on the
argument that corporate political speech can be banned in order to prevent corruption or
its appearance.” Id.; see also id. at 923 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“The Government
concedes that Austin ‘is not the most lucid opinion,’ yet asks us to reaffirm its holding.”
(quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 62, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205))).
In his dissent Justice Stevens insists that “anti-distortion” and “anti-corruption” are really
two sides of the same justificatory coin: “Austin’s antidistortion rationale is itself an
anticorruption rationale . . . . Understood properly, ‘antidistortion’ is simply a variant on
the classic governmental interest in protecting against improper influences on
officeholders that debilitate the democratic process.” Id. at 970 (Stevens, J., concurring
and dissenting). I break the anti-distortion and anti-corruption arguments into two
categories for the sake of exposition, but like most of the categories in this sub-section,
there is obviously considerable overlap between them.
103. See Redish & Wasserman, supra note 43, at 264–68 (discussing the “antidistortion” argument for the restriction of corporate political speech).
104. See id. at 254.
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a new production line; other times it involves supporting the
candidacy of a politician who will support a favorable regulatory
atmosphere for the product. If shareholders do not agree with the
political positions that are necessary to maximize return on a
particular investment, they are perfectly free to divest and re-invest in
a different industry with countervailing political needs, or in a firm in
the same industry that is determined to carry on its operations with a
different political strategy.105 Far from a distortion of the political
views of their shareholders, then, corporate speech would seem to be
a reliable expression of it. In this sense, it is certainly true that
successful corporations concentrate the political voice of their
shareholders, but it does not distort their voices.
This same dynamic is witnessed in the context of non-profit
corporations and political associations. Individuals turn membership
dues over to the ACLU, the NAACP, or the NRA in part because
they believe those organizations will be able to use such resources in
contribution to political discourse more effectively, more clearly, or
with greater amplification than could the members deploying their
resources themselves.106 This is good thinking, as the economies of
scale and specialization of labor attendant to pooled resources will
undoubtedly allow people with common interests to speak more
effectively as a group than could be gained by the sum of their
individual expression.107 It is undoubtedly the case that the ACLU
from time-to-time supports particular political positions with which
individual members disagree.108 Members surely anticipate that this
will be the case when they decide to become members of the group
but figure that the gains they realize from positions they share with
the group will more than offset losses associated with the group’s
advance of positions they oppose.109 Of course, if members get fed-up
with the ACLU they can quit the organization and stop paying dues,
although, unlike shareholders in publicly traded corporations, they do
not have the option of cutting their losses by alienating their shares in
the enterprise to a willing buyer.110

105. Id. at 275.
106. See id. at 272, 274.
107. See id. at 254.
108. See id. at 273.
109. See id.
110. ACLU memberships are not alienable. E-mail from Kitt Abad, Assoc. Manager,
Member Servs., ACLU, to David G. Yosifon, Assistant Professor of Law, Santa Clara
Univ. Sch. of Law (Mar. 2, 2010) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see
Redish & Wasserman, supra note 43, at 274.
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If one were to compare the ease with which a person can invest
or divest in a corporation to the opportunity costs involved in, say,
working a phone bank in support of a candidate for office, it would
seem that those who manage to get involved in a phone bank are far
more likely to be contributing a quantum of discourse to overall
political exchange that is out of proportion to actual support for their
positions than does corporate speech. It is widely known, for
example, that retirees have a great deal more time at their disposal
than do full-time laborers and parents, and so are able to inject their
views into political discourse in a manner disproportionate to the
likely actual level of support for such ideas among the electorate. Yet
few would argue that Congress could ban phone banking by the
elderly because it distorts political discourse in this way. Even if
distortion were a legitimate ground on which to base speech
regulations, then one would still want for a justification for singling
out corporations for distortion-based regulation.
3. The Corruption or Appearance-of-Corruption Argument
It is illegal for citizens to sell their votes or for politicians to
peddle their influence.111 The Supreme Court has permitted Congress
to place limitations on individual campaign contributions as a
prophylactic against such corruption.112 Such contribution limits are
applied to both individuals and corporations.113 Whatever one thinks
of caps on campaign contributions, the corruption justification must
at some point be limited by a definitional assertion about what counts
as genuine democracy. For example, if politicians were overtly,
specifically coordinating policy favors on behalf of third parties in
connection with those parties’ independent expenditures, then there
may be a “too cute” justification for looking past the form of
independent expenditure to the substance of influence peddling. But
if the government could make it illegal for individuals or groups to
knock on doors, attend rallies, or print and distribute their own
handbills in support of a political candidate out of a concern that such
111. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1324 n.1
(2000) (cataloging federal and state prohibitions on vote buying).
112. For example, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23, 28–29 (1976) (per curiam), allowed
for limitations on campaign contributions in order to prevent “corruption,” but the
legislation it allowed did not distinguish between corporate and natural person
contributions.
113. See Chip Nielson & Jason D. Kaune, Overview of Federal Campaign Finance:
Contribution and Expenditure Limitations, in CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES 2008,
at 13, 30–36 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. B-1689, 2008)
(summarizing limitations on political contributions by both individuals and corporations).
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activity would “buy” a politician’s commitment to pass legislation
favored by such groups or individuals, then it would seem that the
corruption justification would allow Congress to outlaw democracy
itself.
A curious subsidiary version of the prevention of corruption
argument focuses not on corruption itself but on the “appearance” of
corruption. The argument here is that even if third-party expenditures
do not actually corrupt the democratic process, they may nevertheless
leave citizens with the impression that corruption abounds, which
may lead people to lose their faith in democracy, which would cause
them to stop participating in democracy, which would undermine
democracy.114 The word “cynicism” is sometimes used in connection
with this justification for regulating third-party expenditures: “Take
away Congress’ authority to regulate the appearance of undue
influence and ‘the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune
could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic
governance.’ ”115 What is weird and suspicious about this argument is
that it would purport to allow Congress to regulate the speech of
some parties because of other people’s misapprehension about the
meaning and consequence of the speech. The reason that “cynicism”
is thought to be a vice is because the cynic has an unduly negative
view of the motives of other people.116 To restrain the speech of some
parties because of other people’s mistaken belief about the

114. See Redish & Wasserman, supra note 43, at 264–68, 285–88 (discussing anticorruption argument). See generally Marlene Arnold Nicholson, The Constitutionality of
the Federal Restrictions on Corporate and Union Campaign Contributions and
Expenditures, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 945, 994–99 (1980) (reviewing corruption and
appearance-of-corruption arguments for restricting corporate political speech); John S.
Shockley, Direct Democracy, Campaign Finance, and the Courts: Can Corruption, Undue
Influence, and Declining Voter Confidence Be Found?, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 377 (1985)
(same).
115. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 963 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting)
(quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 144 (2003), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S.
Ct. 876 (2010)); id. at 974 (“When citizens turn on their televisions and radios before an
election and hear only corporate electioneering, they may lose faith in their capacity, as
citizens, to influence public policy. A Government captured by corporate interests, they
may come to believe, will be neither responsive to their needs nor willing to give their
views a fair hearing. The predictable result is cynicism and disenchantment: an increased
perception that large spenders ‘call the tune’ and a reduced ‘willingness of voters to take
part in democratic governance.’ ” (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 144 (2003),
overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010))).
116. See THOMAS HURKA, VIRTUE, VICE, AND VALUE 94 (2001) (“A more subtle
pure vice is cynicism. A cynic believes the world and people’s lives are less good than they
are commonly taken to be, and, let us assume, actually are. . . . [The cynic] claims that
people are less virtuous and more prone to vice than in fact they are.”).
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consequences of such speech would seem to patronize cynicism,
rather than ameliorate it.
In any event, there is nothing in the corruption or appearance-ofcorruption justifications that would legitimate a regulation that
singles out corporate speech and leaves untouched cynicism-inducing
speech by other wealthy individuals or groups.
4. The Narrow Pursuit of Profit Argument
Some people117 argue that political speech by for-profit business
corporations should not enjoy First Amendment protection because
such speech is calculated only to make profit, not to advance the
operation of democratic processes, or individual expression and selfrealization, which these same folks view as the central purposes of the
First Amendment.118
This justification also cannot withstand scrutiny. A great deal of
political speech by natural persons is undertaken, at least in part, to
make a profit. Indeed the profit motive is often the “but-for” cause of
political speech, in that many authors would not write books or
articles, or speakers give keynote addresses at conferences, unless
there was money in it. As Dr. Johnson put it with slight, but not
constitutionally significant, exaggeration: “No man [or woman] but a
blockhead ever wrote, except for money.”119 Most politicians above
the very local level are paid to serve in their posts and thus seek to
profit from their own political speech. The New York Times, again, is
a for-profit corporation.
One might argue that even if profit is a “but-for” cause of much
speech by political writers and speakers, politicians, and the New
York Times, it is not the sole motivation. But neither is profit the sole
motivation of corporate speech. Corporate law requires that
shareholder profits predominate in the minds of the directors, but it
does not completely forbid the presence of all other considerations,
such as regard for the interests of other corporate stakeholders, or
morality, ethics, and the health of the polity generally.120 Further, the

117. And by people of course I mean, among others, the late, great First Amendment
scholar C. Edwin Baker.
118. C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 196 (1989).
119. JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 529 (David Womersley ed.,
Penguin Books 2008) (1791).
120. See generally Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 763–76 (2005) (reviewing the latitude that corporate directors enjoy,
at the margins, to adopt profit-sacrificing corporate policies, including “operational
restraint” and charitable giving).
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federal securities laws today provide shareholders with a “proposal”
mechanism through which they can author, and have put to a
shareholder vote, proposals for the reform of corporate operations
that bear on ethical or moral aspects of the firm and which have
nothing to do with profit.121 The speech of publicly-traded firms,
therefore, cannot be characterized as exclusively profit-seeking, even
if it is predominately so.
In any event, even if all corporate speech were directed at profitmaking, would not the restriction of such speech amount to viewpoint
discrimination? Many respectable thinkers have argued that the profit
motive and the pursuit of profit is the surest way of stoking
individual, communal, and civic flourishing.122 For-profit corporate
political speech is the embodiment and voice of this view of how
society gets good. Shareholders who invest in profit-maximizing firms
presumably embrace the pro-profits discourse in corporate political
speech acts, and their viewpoints would be discriminated against if
corporate speech were restricted because of the substance—the proprofit orientation—of their speaking agenda.
Unless one is willing to allow the government to regulate
individual or non-profit speech because it was wholly or partly
motivated by a desire to make profits, or because it had only one
point, then some other principle must be found that would justify the
regulation of corporate political speech.123

121. See Yosifon, supra note 2, at 311–12 (discussing the shareholder proposal
mechanism).
122. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 9–10 (Harriman House 2007)
(1776) (“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we
expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.”); see also Martin H.
Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and the Twilight Zone of
Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 67, 87 (2007) (“[T]he corporate form can
be viewed as a type of ‘catalytic self-realization’ that facilitates individuals’ efforts to
realize both their goals and their potential.”).
123. “[T]he difficulty . . . [in] opposing corporate participation in political campaigns is
. . . how to derive a reasoned distinction for prohibiting the expenditures of business
corporations but not those of other organized interests.” Romano, supra note 15, at 1000.
Redish and Wasserman argue that the profit-motive justification for restricting corporate
political speech cannot be right because “[u]nder well-accepted First Amendment doctrine
. . . a speaker’s motivation is entirely irrelevant to the question of constitutional
protection.” Redish & Wasserman, supra note 43, at 269. That is not an entirely accurate
characterization, given that untruthful speech even about a political figure that is made
with “malice” on the part of the speaker is unprotected under New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964), whereas false speech made without malice is protected (so
long as it is not reckless). Id. I think it suffices to note that the profit motive is not
considered sufficient justification to limit speech by other actors, partnerships or entities,
and thus that it does not suffice as a justification to limit corporate speech.
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5. The Shareholder Protection Argument
Some people argue that the state’s interest in protecting
shareholders justifies state restrictions on corporate political
speech.124 From a corporate law perspective, this argument makes
little sense.
Corporate law presumes that directors, not shareholders, control
corporate operations and decide how to deploy corporate
resources.125 Shareholders who disagree with directors on business,
moral, or political grounds have very few options. They can mount an
extremely expensive campaign to oust incumbent directors; they can
mount an extremely-unlikely-to-succeed shareholder proposal
campaign through the federal securities laws seeking to change
corporate policy; if they are rich enough, they can buy out the
company outright; or, as is the usual course for disgruntled
shareholders, they can sell their stock. Business law typically does not
micromanage decisions about deploying corporate resources.
Corporate law typically has no interest in protecting idiosyncratic
shareholders from having their moral or political ideologies
undermined by corporate operations. It would be anomalous and
destructive of the power of directorial authority in firm governance to
start down that road in connection with political speech. There is
nothing special about corporate political speech that distinguishes it
from other opportunities directors have to engage in conduct that
differs from the social, moral, or political interests of individual
shareholders. It would be incongruous at best to argue that
shareholders need no protection against corporate decisions to drill
for oil in the oceans, distribute pornography, invest in sub-prime
mortgages, or purchase luxury boxes for professional sporting events,
but that they need protection against corporate decisions to spend
money endeavoring to influence the political process that makes rules
and regulations bearing on the operations and profitability of the
firm.
Sometimes this argument is framed as a loyalty problem, with the
claim being that directors seek to advance their own ideological
interests through corporate political speech rather than the interests
of the firm.126 Where directors engage in such disloyal conduct,

124. See, e.g., Sitkoff, supra note 43, at 1113–23 (reviewing shareholder protection
arguments for limiting corporate political speech and collecting citations).
125. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2001) (“The business and affairs of every
corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”).
126. See Sitkoff, supra note 43, at 1113–23.
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corporate law has a ready remedy through breach of fiduciary duty
claims.127 That it may sometimes be difficult to distinguish between
self-aggrandizing and faithful corporate decisions is not a problem
that is unique to political speech—it is also hard to tell whether luxury
boxes at ball games are really good for shareholders or just good for
directors. Still, where directors spend on behalf of candidates who are
family members or friends, or on behalf of causes that are pet
projects, especially where such candidacies or projects are wholly
irrelevant to or at odds with the corporate purpose, then corporate
law provides a remedy through shareholder derivative suits that put
the onus on directors to demonstrate that “interested” transactions
were entirely fair to the corporation and its shareholders.128 But the
going view in mainstream corporate theory is that robust equity
markets, competitive labor and consumer markets, and social norms
among directors more or less effectively control such opportunistic
conduct.129 If directors were able to regularly appropriate corporate
assets to serve their own, rather than the firm’s, political agenda, then
we would likely see Delaware, or some state that would like to steal
away Delaware’s largess in incorporation fees, promulgate an
incorporation statute that made political speech ultra vires. The fact
that we do not see such statutes or widespread shareholder
antagonism for the adoption of similarly restricting bylaws suggests
that corporate political speech tends to benefit shareholders, not
harm them. In the wake of Citizens United, some scholars have
argued that shareholders should be allowed to vote to strip directors
of the power to spend on politics, or else that the default rule should
be that directors do not have the power to spend on politics unless
shareholders affirmatively vote them that power.130 I think it is
implausible to think that the shareholders of any one firm, or
shareholders as a class, would be interested in so binding their
principals’ hands (or tongues, as it were).
It is worth noting that the disciplining power of highly liquid
capital markets witnessed in the for-profit corporate world is not
127. JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS § 10.09, at 202–05 (2d
ed. 2003) (summarizing corporate directors’ duty of loyalty).
128. See id. §§ 10.09–10.12, at 202–15 (reviewing corporate law frameworks for
enforcing directors’ loyalty obligations).
129. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, at 73–155; see also Romano, supra note 15, at 996
(“[T]he disciplining power of markets aided by appropriate incentive contracts restrains
managers from consistently engaging in political activities adverse to shareholder
interests.”).
130. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech:
Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 97–105 (2010).
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similarly available to constrain the opportunistic conduct of highranking officers of non-profit membership associations, and yet few
would sanction restricting the political speech of such associations on
those grounds.131
6. The Foreign or Non-Resident Influence Argument
To the extent that national or sub-national political boundaries
are legitimate, then it may also be legitimate for national and subnational political entities to restrain outsiders from influencing their
politics or elections. Because publicly-traded corporations may be
held in part by foreign individuals or foreign corporations, one might
argue that Congress should be able to restrict corporate political
speech in order to keep out the influences of such foreign interests. In
his Citizens United dissent Justice Stevens’ emphasized the foreignagent angle:
Although they make enormous contributions to our society,
corporations are not actually members of it. They cannot vote
or run for office. Because they may be managed and controlled
by nonresidents, their interests may conflict in fundamental
respects with the interests of eligible voters. . . . Our lawmakers
have a compelling constitutional basis, if not also a democratic
duty, to take measures designed to guard against the potentially
deleterious effects of corporate spending in local and national
races.132
The trouble is that if one were to embrace this position, there is
again nothing in the argument that distinguishes corporations from
other associations. The Catholic Church, for example, and the AntiDefamation League, both receive funding from foreign sources, with
literally universal agendas, and both participate broadly in American
political discourse. What’s sound regulatory sauce for the
international corporate goose is sound regulatory sauce for the
international associational gander.
Further, if one takes a very broad view of listener interests in
political speech, then it is hard to see what legitimate interest
governments could have in restricting foreign speech. If more speech
131. See Nicole Gilkeson, For-Profit Scandal in the Nonprofit World: Should States
Force Sarbanes-Oxley Provisions onto Nonprofit Corporations?, 95 GEO. L.J. 831, 832
(2007) (reviewing widespread problem of disloyal agency in non-profit associations).
132. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 930 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring and
dissenting); see also id. at 947 (“Although we have not reviewed them directly, we have
never cast doubt on laws that place special restrictions on campaign spending by foreign
nationals. See, e.g., 2 U. S. C. §441e(a)(1).”).
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is always valuable to listeners, then citizens should simply be able to
hear speech from foreign persons, groups, or countries, discount such
speech as appropriate considering the foreigner’s foreign interests,
and go about forming their own opinions within the marketplace of
ideas.
C.

Sound-But-Ultimately-Scary Arguments for Regulating Corporate
Speech

While none of the arguments so far analyzed seem to this author
to stand up to scrutiny, there is at least one argument for restricting
political speech which I believe is sound and unavoidable. The
argument is inescapable, but it is also frightful in its implications.
Humans are finite creatures. We have limited cognitive capacity
and a limited time on earth.133 We can only take in and make sense of
a limited amount of stimuli around us.134 We are vulnerable to drownout and overwhelmance if one speaker or group of speakers can
dominate a discursive space or time for speaking and listening.135 The
First Amendment was made for humanity, not humanity for the First
Amendment.136 The point (or points) of the First Amendment is to
enable individual and group expression and to engender the robust
production and circulation of ideas that are useful to people generally
and to the well-functioning of a free and democratic society in
particular. Given the scarcity of the human condition, our limited
faculties and time, these interests can only be served if speech can be
restricted so that some speakers cannot drown out other speakers and
overwhelm listeners.
While most of his long dissent in Citizens United is focused on
the kinds of arguments dismissed in the previous sub-sections, Justice
Stevens is on his firmest footing when he finally turns late in his
opinion to the predicament of human scarcity: “All of the majority’s
theoretical arguments turn on a proposition with undeniable surface
appeal but little grounding in evidence or experience, ‘that there is no
such thing as too much speech.’ ”137 He drops a footnote: “Of course,

133. See generally Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 9 (analyzing the implications of
human cognitive limitations for legal theory and policymaking).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. With apologies to Mark 2:27 (“The Sabbath was made for humanity, not humanity
for the Sabbath.”).
137. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 975 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting
Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 695 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
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no presiding person in a courtroom, legislature, classroom, polling
place, or family dinner would take this hyperbole literally.”138 His text
then continues:
If individuals in our society had infinite free time to listen to
and contemplate every last bit of speech uttered by anyone,
anywhere; . . . then I suppose the majority’s premise would be
sound. In the real world, we have seen, corporate domination of
the airwaves prior to an election may decrease the average
listener’s exposure to relevant viewpoints, and it may diminish
citizens’ willingness and capacity to participate in the
democratic process.139
First Amendment law in a few narrow places is responsive to the
problem of scarcity and drown-out. For example, the Court allows
states to limit ballot access to candidates with a bona fide chance of
winning an election and allows state-run television to broadcast
campaign debates that allow only candidates with substantial support
to take the stage.140 First Amendment theory in general, however,
does not yet have a cogent response to the drown-out,
overwhelmance, or human limitations argument.141 A coherent theory
of free speech must recognize that the analytic escape hatch of solving
all speech-related problems with appeals to “more speech” ultimately
leads to a dead end.142
Our concept of free speech cannot rest on unreliable fantasies
about what kind of species we are. Professor Redish has argued,
unpersuasively, that
138. Id. at n.74.
139. Id. at 975–76.
140. Justice Stevens emphasizes these cases in his Citizens United dissent. See id. at 946
(citing Ark. Ed. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (upholding restrictions
allowed on televised debates); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (upholding
restrictions on electioneering near polling stations)). The Court has also limited speech
where the listeners or readers are unable to easily avoid the speech. See Rowan v. U.S.
Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (“[N]o one has a right to press even ‘good’
ideas on an unwilling recipient.”).
141. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 972 (“I have taken the view that a legislature may
place reasonable restrictions on individuals’ electioneering expenditures in the service of
the governmental interests explained above [which may be read to include drown-out
problems], and in recognition of the fact that such restrictions are not direct restraints on
speech but rather on its financing. See, e.g., Randall [v. Sorrell], 548 U.S., at 273 [2006]
(dissenting opinion).”).
142. The Citizens United majority offers blithe abstractions but never confronts directly
the real problem of drown-out: “Factions should be checked by permitting them all to
speak and by entrusting the people to judge what is true and what is false.” Id. at 907
(majority opinion). “[I]t is our law and our tradition that more speech, not less, is the
governing rule.” Id. at 911.
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[o]ne cannot construe the First Amendment to allow the
government conclusively to determine either how citizens
process information or when the fear of an information
overload dictates a need for governmental intervention. Society
can never be sure that such a point ever exists, much less that
citizens have, in fact, reached it. The commitment to the free
speech concept clearly implies that too much information—if,
indeed, there could ever be such a thing—always is preferable
to too little.143
Redish asserts that the First Amendment cannot countenance
government adopting a specific view of human information
processing.144 His position, however, requires us to adopt a view of
humanity that is not only specific but false, and that is a view of
humans as capable of processing any amount of speech. To establish a
coherent and defensible theory of free speech, theorists must begin in
precisely the place that Redish considers off-limits: a realistic
conception of the human mind.145
The drown-out justification is a sound and necessary basis for
regulating political speech, but its implications are troubling. While
we do know as a biological fact that humans can only process so much
speech, how to quantify the limit or the latitude that government
should be entitled to in regulating on the basis of that limit is
extremely difficult to figure. Moreover, if we are to take this
justification seriously we must look beyond the quantum of speech
and also consider its persuasiveness. If an articulate speaker can
occupy as much of a listener’s imagination with 100 words as an
inarticulate speaker could with 1000 words, should then government
be entitled to, on the basis of the drown-out justification, limit the
articulate speaker to 100 words while providing the inarticulate
speaker 1000 words? And there is the question of making space in the
discursive arena for highly marginal ideas or speakers. Given our
cognitive limitations, should Congress be permitted to restrain the
speech of those proponing widely held views in order to make time
and space available for new or obscure perspectives? These are
challenging, scary questions, but we will not have a complete or
coherent policy of free speech until we are able to answer it.
This Article does not endeavor to solve this problem. It rests
instead on the simpler provisional conclusions that drown-out, while a
143. Redish & Wasserman, supra note 43, at 290.
144. Id. at 290–91.
145. See David G. Yosifon, Resisting Deep Capture: The Commercial Speech Doctrine
and Junk-Food Advertising to Children, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 507, 599–601 (2006).
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good reason to limit speech generally, is not a sufficient reason to
limit corporate speech in particular. After all, many individuals in our
society are wealthier than many corporations and can drown out the
speech not only of other natural persons, but of small, poor
corporations as well.146
D. Practical Impediments to Regulating Corporate Speech
Even if one could come up with a normative justification for why
corporate speech should be subject to greater government restriction
than other associational speech, and even if the Supreme Court were
to sanction such a view under the First Amendment, it would still
remain practically impossible to restrict corporate speech in a manner
that would solve the public choice problem in the shareholder
primacy theory of corporate law.
If regulation of campaign donations and expenditures were
allowed, there would still be myriad ways corporations could
influence the political process that would prove even more difficult to
regulate. For example, suppose a corporation, forbidden from making
any direct campaign contributions or expenditures, decided that it
was going to increase the salary of its top management by exactly the
amount of money that it would have spent on political campaigns, and
that management donated or expended such money on political
campaigns they thought would benefit their firms. Suppose this was
the practice among all corporations in a particular industry and that
the market for corporate management came to efficiently price wages
in terms of the political contributions that they made. Surely it would
not be permissible for the government to regulate the private
campaign expenditures of corporate managers, unless we are going to
permit a much broader kind of political speech regulation in our
society.
The foregoing analysis makes clear that what is at issue in
Citizens United is not really the disproportionate or corrosive
146. In Bellotti the Court rejected Massachusetts’ argument that corporate spending
threatened to “drown out” other speech on referenda, concluding that such a concern was
purely speculative, unsupported by empirical findings. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 789–90 (1978). While Bellotti could in this sense be read to mean that the
government may regulate on a drown-out theory if it can prove drown-out empirically,
nothing in such a principle would distinguish corporate drown-out from drown-out by
other kinds of speakers. In any event, it seems unlikely that, even with evidence, Bellottitype legislation could be sustained under a drown-out theory, given the Court’s statement
elsewhere in the case that “the concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to
the First Amendment.” Id.
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influence of corporations as compared to natural persons in our
politics, but rather the disproportionate influence of wealthy and
powerful natural persons over the relatively poor and powerless in
our politics. Focusing on the limited viability of justifications for
limiting corporate speech reveals that talking about the power of
corporations has obfuscated the much more profound problem that is
at the heart of motivations for limiting corporate speech: the desire
for equality and justice in the political domain. Political efforts to
restrain corporate speech are really efforts to restrain a powerful
interest group in order to allow other interest groups to have more
influence in government. Because the Supreme Court has told us that
we cannot keep corporations out of our democracy, then the next best
way to accomplish the goals motivating such legislation is to bring
more democracy into our corporations.
III. SOLVING THE PUBLIC CHOICE PROBLEM IN CORPORATE LAW
One of the strange things about Justice Stevens’ dissent in
Citizens United, and widespread political and popular opposition to
the case, is the implicit assumption that the only thing Congress can
do to protect democracy from being undermined by corporate power
is to stop corporate political activity. This is plainly not the case. If the
problem is that corporations are too powerful, Congress has a
number of avenues available to it other than speech regulation to
solve that problem. Congress could forbid corporations altogether. Or
Congress could forbid those elements of the corporate nexus that
make them powerful—for example, the separation of ownership and
control. Or Congress could tax corporate operations until capital,
labor, and consumers prefer to deal with each other in small
partnerships rather than make use of the onerous corporate form.
The problem with such corporation-weakening responses to the
public choice problem in corporate law is that we would lose the great
efficiencies—the economies of scale that create new jobs and better
products—that corporate organization provides. This kind of
approach to the problem of corporate political speech would be
slitting the throat of the golden goose; it would silence its
troublesome political squawks to be sure, but at the cost of losing its
socially useful golden eggs. Far better, I will argue in this Part, to
retain (switching metaphors) the promising baby of the corporate
form, but to drain away the polluting bathwater of the shareholder
primacy norm in corporate governance, replacing it with the
enlivening wash of stakeholder-oriented governance.
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If we cannot rely on contract or external regulation to protect the
interests of non-shareholders, then shareholder primacy must be
altered in favor of a system that requires corporate directors to attend
to the interests of non-shareholding stakeholders at the level of firm
governance. When we say presently that directors are “fiduciaries” of
shareholders we mean, in the words of Easterbrook and Fischel, that
directors must “work hard and honestly”147 to advance shareholder
interests. To make directors fiduciaries of workers and consumers,
then, would be to say that because contract is insufficient to protect
consumer interests and because the backstop of government
regulation is implausible under shareholder primacy, directors must
consider it their duty to “work hard and honestly” not only to
advance shareholder interests, but worker and consumer interests as
well.
Corporate law has nothing substantive to say about what
constitutes “work[ing] hard and honestly.”148 The business judgment
rule provides directors with complete discretion to determine what
kinds of business operations are in the best interests of their
principals.149 While unrepentantly agnostic on substance, however,
corporate law is much more confident enforcing procedural
obligations on fiduciaries.150 In order to gain the protective cover of
the business judgment rule, directors must be informed, and they
must deliberate.151 Satisfying this obligation may take different forms
in different circumstances, from reading reports, to hearing
presentations, to engaging in discussion and debate. To require
directors to attend as fiduciaries to the interests of workers and
consumers at the level of firm governance would thus also provide
workers and consumers with the benefits of the process obligation.
This obligation constitutes a discursive occasion in which multiplestakeholder interests and vulnerabilities implicated in particular
corporate decisions, or broad corporate strategies, would be voiced,
heard, and considered.152

147. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 91.
148. Id.
149. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 127, § 10.01, at 184–86 (summarizing the business
judgment rule).
150. Id. at 185.
151. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985) (explicating this
process obligation).
152. For further examination of how multi-stakeholder governance might be
operationalized on the board of directors, see David G. Yosifon, Discourse Norms As
Default Rules: Structuring Corporate Speech to Multiple Stakeholders, 21 HEALTH
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Multi-stakeholder governance will help to solve the public choice
problem inherent in the shareholder primacy system, a problem that
will only be exacerbated after Citizens United. Under shareholder
primacy, directors have the incentive and the opportunity to
appropriate value from workers and consumers on behalf of
shareholders. Under a stakeholderist corporate governance regime,
directors are restrained by the golden yoke of fiduciary obligation
from engaging in the kind of exploitation of non-shareholders that is
impelled by the current system. Thus, under a multi-stakeholder
regime, non-shareholders have less need for external government
regulation because they are receiving greater attention within firm
governance. Further, to the extent that corporations continue to
engage in political activity under a multi-stakeholder system, they will
do so on behalf of numerous stakeholders, rather than for
shareholders alone.
Multiple stakeholder governance would have to be implemented
by statutory reform. Some readers of drafts of this Article and related
work have suggested that the same public choice problems that I
emphasize in critiquing the social utility of shareholder primacy norm
would also preclude the implementation of the multi-stakeholder
regime that I advocate, given that shareholders would prefer the
status quo and shareholder primacy corporations would work to
maintain it. I have two basic responses. First, this Article is primarily
concerned with assessing the coherence of corporate theory. My
argument is that shareholder primacy is not viable unless one is
prepared to allow government to restrict corporate political activity,
which I argue would be unprincipled, unwise, and, according to the
Supreme Court, unconstitutional. Multi-stakeholder governance, on
the other hand, is coherent without requiring restrictions on
corporate political activity. So if you were trying to decide, from the
proverbial original position behind the “veil of ignorance,”153 whether
to start a society with either shareholder primacy or multiplestakeholder firms, then you would choose the latter.
Second, from a more practical perspective, political theorists
argue that ordinary public choice dynamics are altered in times of
heighted political sensitivity or activity. When a public policy issue
becomes highly salient, dispersed groups with diverse interests can for
MATRIX (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 27–34) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
153. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 10–15 (rev. ed. 1999) (arguing that legal
rules should be developed from behind a hypothetical veil of ignorance in which one does
not know the class position or set of individual skills that one would have in the regime).
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a hot moment come together to overcome the advantages that
smaller, more focused groups typically enjoy in the competition for
regulatory favor.154 The somewhat dramatic kind of corporate
governance reform that I am exploring could be implemented in such
a moment. The purpose of this Article is to make the case that this
kind of change is worth pursuing when that kind of occasion emerges.
Hot political moments also would present the possibility of
developing more robust external regulation favoring workers,
consumers, or communities, but once there is a return to politics as
usual, then shareholder primacy firms’ collective action advantage reemerges to once again undermine and evade such external regulation.
That pernicious dynamic is curbed when the hot political moment is
instead used to implement basic and desirable changes to the internal
structure of corporate governance.
A. Institutionalizing Multi-Stakeholder Corporate Governance
1. Conventional Account of Why Multi-Stakeholder Governance
Cannot Work
This Part explores the plausibility of formalizing and
institutionalizing multi-stakeholder corporate governance. Most
corporate law scholars believe that shareholder primacy in firm
governance is in the best interest of all corporate stakeholders, and
therefore few find it necessary to reach the question of the feasibility
of a multi-stakeholder regime.155 When shareholder primacists do
examine the plausibility of multi-fiduciarism, they conclude that it is
not operationally plausible.156
A multi-stakeholder regime could conceivably be structured on a
corporate board of directors through either an “unclassified” or a
“classified” form. In an unclassified system each director would be
154. See, e.g., James J. Park, The Competing Paradigms of Securities Regulation, 57
DUKE L.J. 625, 675 (2007) (“Many commentators have observed that there is a
relationship between the business cycle and the production of securities regulation. During
boom times, industry has more influence, there is less public demand for regulation,
regulators tend to be more cautious, and less new regulation is produced. Busts tend to
reveal scandals that cause public outrage, reducing industry influence, emboldening
regulators, and leading to the passage of more restrictive laws. An example of such a law is
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which Congress passed in response to public pressure after the
collapse of Enron. These arguments can be seen as a form of public choice theory, which
has long been an influential framework for explaining the production of regulation.”
(citing, inter alia, Joseph A. Grundfest, Punctuated Equilibria in the Evolution of United
States Securities Regulation, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 1 (2002))).
155. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 38.
156. Id.
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responsible for attending to the interests of multiple stakeholders.
According to conventional accounts, an unclassified multistakeholder regime is impossible because a director asked to serve
more than one master has been “freed of both and is answerable to
neither.”157 Such a director, shareholder primacists insist, can pursue
her own interests rather than her principals’ because she can always
rebuff any stakeholder complaint of directorial malfeasance by
arguing that the conduct was meant to advance the interests of some
other stakeholder, and thus was in accord with the directors’ duties.158
Shareholder primacists further insist that even the loyal multistakeholder director would be forever paralyzed, never knowing
whether to privilege the interests of one as opposed to another
stakeholder in a given corporate decision or set of decisions.159
The other way to structure a multi-stakeholder regime would be
through a classified board in which individual directors would be
charged with representing the interests of particular stakeholders—a
director for shareholders, a director for workers, one for consumers,
etc. While the two-masters problem might be mitigated with such an
approach, critics insist that a classified multi-stakeholder board would
result in disastrously cacophonous dynamics on a decision-making
body that requires cooperation.160 A classified board would result in
“gangsterism” in which each director tries to maximize return to his
own charges at the expense of the other groups, and of the enterprise
as a whole.161
In light of the market manipulation and public choice problems
analyzed above, these conventional arguments against multifiduciarism must be re-examined. I have argued that the public choice
problem in corporate law is caused in part by the strength of the
corporate organizational form. In what follows I will again focus on
the power of corporate design, this time to argue that multifiduciarism in firm governance is more plausible than its critics have
presumed. I argue that the true “genius”162 of our corporate law lies in
157. Id.
158. Id. at 37–39.
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., Alfred F. Conrad, Reflections on Public Interest Directors, 75 MICH. L.
REV. 941, 950 (1977) (“To most executives, the vision of a board of directors composed of
advocates of competing objectives would be a nightmare.”).
161. Beardsley Ruml, Corporate Managers As a Locus of Power, in 3 SOCIAL
MEANING OF LEGAL CONCEPTS: THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF CORPORATE
MANAGEMENT 219, 234 (Edmond N. Cahn ed., 1950).
162. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW, at ix (1993)
(celebrating the “genius” of American corporate law).
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its hierarchical decision-making structure, not in its singular
governance maxim, and that this structure can be deployed to
ameliorate the purported problems with an unclassified multistakeholder governance regime.
2. The Essential Submission to Board Dominance
Corporations are associations of numerous individuals and
groups, all of whom stand to gain from trading among what each of
them brings to the table—capital, labor, credit, and consumption. Left
to their own devices, these stakeholders would encounter huge costs
in trying to effectively coordinate their contributions and huge costs
in fighting over the gains to the trades in which they engage. The
brilliance of the corporate board of directors is that it imposes a rule
by fiat that cheaply overcomes these potentially paralyzing problems
of coordination and rent-seeking. Professor Bainbridge argues that
the real beauty of American corporate law is this decision-making
mechanism that it provides to help overcome coordination and
distribution problems: “The chief economic virtue of the public
corporation is not that it permits the aggregation of large capital
pools, but rather that it provides a hierarchical decision-making
structure well-suited to the problem of operating a large business
enterprise with numerous employees, managers, shareholders,
creditors, and other inputs.”163
In corporate law the board is final not because it is infallible; it is
final because finality is an enormously effective mechanism for
achieving social organization.164 To give any person, group, or
institution the power or authority to review the substance of board
decisions would be to replace the board with such a person, group, or
institution, which would itself need to be given final authority, or
would have to be reviewable in still some other way.165 Given that
some group must have final authority, and since corporate directors
are likely to make better business decisions than are jurists,
administrative agencies, or legislatures, it is better to make the board
itself the final arbiters of what is in the firm’s best interest.166
Of course fiat could be more cheaply and decisively
accomplished by a single authoritarian executive than by a board of
163.
164.
165.
Arrow
56–57.
166.

BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, at 233.
Id. at 42.
Bainbridge is informed by the logic of “collective action,” as espoused by Kenneth
and the teachings of contemporary economics and social science. See id. at 46–47,
See id.
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directors. If just one person were in charge of the corporation, it
would be easier to reward accomplishment and punish failure.167
Bainbridge argues that corporate law sacrifices the simplicity and
certainty of despotism in order to take advantage of the greater
performance that group decision-making by boards can provide.168
Although individuals perform better than groups when working on
creative endeavors, groups outperform even their strongest individual
members when engaging in evaluative judgment and problem-solving,
which is the kind of work that boards undertake.169 Having a board of
directors multiplies the number of backgrounds, perspectives, and
connections that can be brought to bear on behalf of the corporate
enterprise. Finally, and crucially, the board provides a “cloud of
witnesses” for the behavior of each individual board member.170
Knowing that their fellow board members are watching keeps each
director working hard, honestly, and in conformance with widely
shared moral and ethical standards.171
Bainbridge’s “director primacy” theory presupposes that the
shareholders on whose behalf the firm is managed will have divergent
interests.172 For instance, the “interests of large and small investors
167. Bainbridge emphasizes the problem of “social loafing.” Id. at 81. When people
working in groups know that it will be difficult for those evaluating the group to
distinguish the contributions of individual members, then individual group members tend
to put in less effort than they do if working, and being observed, alone. Id. Bainbridge
cites to social science demonstrating this effect. Id. The explanation for this effect is that in
group-work conditions people selfishly believe they can free-ride on the efforts of others;
they also know rationally that if they put in greater efforts than their cohort they will not
be rewarded for their efforts, which will be attributed to the group. Id.
168. Id. at 77–104.
169. Id. at 89–94, 101–03.
170. Id. at 102.
171. Id. at 101–03.
172. There is some terminological messiness in corporate law scholarship that could
bear tidying up. The term “shareholder primacy” is sometimes used to refer to the
principle purpose of corporate governance, i.e., “shareholder primacy” as the
maximization of shareholder value, but at other times “shareholder primacy” is used with
reference to the very different issue of the mechanics of corporate governance, i.e.,
“shareholder primacy” as a mode of organization that embraces significant shareholder
influence in corporate operations. See id. at 53–57. Bainbridge refers to his own theory of
corporate governance as “directory primacy” because it privileges the importance of
directorial discretion and marginalizes the potential for shareholder interference in board
decision-making. Id. at 233–35. But his “director primacy” in organization still embraces
“shareholder primacy” as its governance goal. Id. Because there is more widespread
agreement in mainstream scholarship on corporate purpose than governance design, I use
the term “shareholder primacy” to refer to corporate purpose. Because Bainbridge’s work
on “director primacy” is so influential I use his term “director primacy” to refer to the
structural claim that directors should dominate the governance of the firm. But I prefer to
call the view that shareholders should be heavily involved in firm governance
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often differ.”173 Additional divergence is seen between shareholders
who are highly diversified (and want risk-preferring activity) and
those who are not (and would prefer more risk-averse strategies), and
between shareholders who need short-term gains (like the elderly or
sick) and those who are seeking long-term profitability (like the
young and healthy).174 Rent-seeking by these disharmonious
shareholders would undermine the efficiency of corporate operations,
decreasing the size of the pie that would otherwise be available for all
to share. Because of their divergent interests, Bainbridge argues,
shareholders cannot be given substantial influence in corporate
governance; instead the insulated, collegial body that is the board of
directors must be given the authority to run the firm as they see fit.175
Directors do not pursue the interest of large shareholders over small,
or small over large, or short-term over long-term, or the reverse, but
rather directors balance the interests of these groups with the hopes
of assuring that they are all reasonably satisfied, such that the
corporation may successfully carry on its socially useful operations.
Bainbridge’s arguments for the institutional competency of the
independent corporate board are so rich that they reveal the poverty
of his and other scholars’ arguments against the plausibility of multistakeholder obligation in firm governance. Taking the prospect of
employee representation as his foil, Bainbridge goes after multifiduciarism with a logician’s precision: “[F]or consensus to function
. . . two conditions must be met: equivalent interests and information.
Neither condition can be met when both employee and shareholder

“shareholderism,” or shareholder democracy, rather than the unnecessarily confusing
“shareholder primacy.” This Article rejects shareholder primacy as a goal and argues that
a multi-stakeholder regime can be empowered through director primacy in firm
governance.
173. Id. at 228.
174. Other than solving dual class dilemmas in favor of “common stock” interests, the
Delaware courts have ducked the other conflicts between shareholders, though at times it
has been heard to mumble about the obligation to pursue “the long-run interests of the
shareholders.” Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986). Courts do not
appear to be serious about the “long-term” proposition, citing the board’s discretion about
when to pay dividends as the essence of the directors’ exclusive prerogatives, for example.
See, e.g., Kamin v. Am. Express, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 810–12 (Sup. Ct.) (providing
touchstone statement of the broad protections provided to the board of directors under
the business judgment rule), aff’d, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (App. Div. 1976). See generally
Arthur B. Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships, 54 AM. U. L. REV.
75 (2004) (cataloging conflicts faced by directors and analyzing court treatment of conflicts
between the duty of loyalty and the duty of care across stakeholders and finding the
loyalty obligations are privileged in such conflicts).
175. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, at 37–44, 53–57.
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representatives are on the board.”176 But this argument contradicts his
initial claim that the board is necessary because shareholders do not
have “equivalent interests”—some are seeking long-term gains,
others short-term gains, some are diversified, others are not.
Bainbridge never doubts that directors, freed from the narrow
interests of specific groups of shareholders, will be able to balance
their interests in the boardroom.177 This is the same dynamic that
would be realized under a multi-stakeholder system. It turns out that
a person, or a board, may serve more than one master, as long as the
masters cannot second guess or meddle in the servant’s decision. Thus
does the strength of Bainbridge’s director primacy position
undermine his opposition to multi-fiduciarism in board governance.
This argument illustrates both that board independence makes
multi-fiduciarism possible, and that board independence is necessary
in order for multi-fiduciarism to work. Progressive scholars have
tended to advocate greater stakeholder involvement in corporate
governance, but the present analysis emphasizes that it is director
primacy that makes multi-fiduciarism possible.178
Finally, it is not true, as shareholder primacists claim, that a
multi-stakeholder regime necessarily frees the director to pursue her
own interests at the corporate expense. As Bainbridge and others
make clear, capital, labor, and product markets; duty of loyalty
claims;179 and norms, ethics, and values all operate to constrain
directorial self-interest.180 Indeed, Bainbridge is so committed to
director primacy that he insists that directors must have broad
authority even to develop “poison pills” and other structural defenses
that can repel hostile takeovers.181 Many legal economists believe that
a robust market for control is necessary to keep directors working
hard and honestly for fear that some corporate raider will see that
there is money to be made by acquiring under-performing firms and
replacing malingering directors.182 Bainbridge fears that forbidding
176. Id. at 46; see id. at 47–49.
177. See id. at 82–104.
178. See generally PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995)
(collecting seminal stakeholderist scholarship).
179. The business judgment rule precludes judicial review of the prudence of ordinary
business decisions, but where self-interest is implicated, directors bear the burden of
proving to a jurist that a challenged transaction was entirely fair to the firm. See Bayer v.
Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 5 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (providing classic statement of the analytic
framework applicable to duty of loyalty claims).
180. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, at 100–04, 160–75.
181. Id. at 134–54.
182. See generally, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of
a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981)
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directors from developing structural defenses invites a crack in the
armor of director primacy that will only result in harmful secondguessing of more and more decision-making by incompetent judges
and shareholders.183 The Delaware courts are largely in accord with
Bainbridge, as directors are indeed given substantial latitude even
when erecting defenses to hostile takeovers.184 This leaves the market
for control relatively limp and puts ever greater reliance on the power
of ethics, norms, and honor to keep directors working hard and
honest. If these mechanisms are sufficient to keep directors honest
under shareholder primacy, then they should be equally sufficient to
keep them honest under a stakeholderist regime.185

(emphasizing the disciplining power that a robust market for control exerts on incumbent
management teams and arguing that allowing incumbent boards to erect structural
defenses to hostile takeovers undermines such disciplining power).
183. For example, suppose directors of a firm rich with real assets started selling off
those assets and paying high dividends to shareholders. To some this might seem like an
ordinary business decision, protected from scrutiny by the business judgment rule. Others,
however, might interpret such a move as a kind of a “structural defense” designed to make
the firm look less attractive to raiders. If courts or shareholders were empowered to
review such decisions on the grounds that directors were obstructing the market for
control, then virtually any decision by directors could be subject to review on such
grounds, thus destroying the power of director primacy. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, at
149–52.
184. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154–55 (Del.
1994) (board may erect structural defenses to hostile tender offer that is not structurally
coercive in order to vindicate incumbent board’s long-term vision for the company);
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (applying “enhanced
business judgment” rule to defenses adopted by incumbent board and allowing board to
adopt structural defense against structurally coercive hostile tender offer which offered
shareholders substantial premium over market price); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., The
Professional Bear Hug: The ESB Proposal As a Conscious Effort to Make the Delaware
Courts Confront the Basic “Just Say No” Question, 55 STAN. L. REV. 863, 864 (2002)
(arguing that on the question of structural defenses, Delaware “has displayed a studied
ambivalence . . . recognizing the need for heightened scrutiny when boards use pills, but
hesitating to override the judgment of independent directors to block acquisition offers”).
185. One way corporate practice aligns shareholder and directorial incentives is to pay
directors partly in salary and partly in the firm’s stock, or to require them to purchase a
substantial stake in the firm. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, at 167–70. Such practices have
been correlated with better corporate performance. Id. at 170. This ties directors’ interests
both with those of workers and those of shareholders. A similar association could be
accomplished by requiring corporate directors also to maintain some consumption stake in
the firm. Another step in this direction would be to require directors either to live or to
spend significant parts of the year living in a community in which the firm’s operations
have disproportionate impact.
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3. The Limits of Submission: Consumer Participation in Firm
Governance
Stakeholder voting has a limited role to play in corporate
governance. “While notions of shareholder democracy permit
powerful rhetoric, corporations are not New England town meetings.
Put another way, we need not value corporate democracy simply
because we value political democracy.”186 But neither must we
entirely give up on democracy where the model of the New England
town meeting would not work. In contemporary society, democratic
values are realized in myriad ways more modern and manageable
than the romantic or stylized idea of the town meeting. Because of the
collective action problems that make it useful for activity to be
organized through firms to begin with, it is certainly true that
stakeholder voting must be, as Bainbridge argues with respect to
shareholder suffrage, “not an integral aspect of the corporate
decision-making structure, but rather an accountability device of last
resort to be used sparingly, at best.”187 Similarly, board dominance in
a multi-fiduciary regime does not necessarily mean that there should
be no involvement by stakeholders in the selection of the board.
Limited participation of multiple stakeholders in corporate elections
may be needed to give teeth to the stakeholder governance regime,
just as some limited voting by shareholders is presently needed to
supply some accountability to the shareholder primacy norm.
The mechanics of extending corporate suffrage would be
complicated, but not insurmountable. When shareholders buy stock
they get a claim on residual profits and a vote proportionate to their
equity stake in the firm. Employees presently receive in exchange for
their labor a mix of salary, working conditions, and benefits. To these
might be added a proportion of votes in corporate elections. When
consumers turn over their cash to the firm they receive corporate
goods with varying attributes, sometimes including warranties or
ongoing service. The consumer might also gain with her purchase a
quantum of voting rights in corporate operations. Many corporate
consumers today have membership codes or identification numbers
which track their purchases and calculate “miles” or “points” that can

186. Id. at 143. Indeed, as Bainbridge describes, not entirely tongue-in-cheek, “[b]oard
of director elections usually look a lot like old Soviet elections—there is only one slate of
candidates and the authorities know how each voter voted.” Id. at 180.
187. Id. at 235.
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be exchanged for prizes or rebates.188 The same technology could be
deployed to tally the accumulation of voting rights with frequent
purchases. These groups might elect their own directors—workers
voting for worker directors, consumers for consumer directors, etc.
But a better approach would undoubtedly be for each of the groups
to elect directors who would then be obliged to serve all corporate
stakeholders in unclassified fashion, as the unclassified form would
seem better placed to exploit the authoritative latitude of the
directory primacy model of firm governance.189
The fact that markets are international, but politics local, means
that when contract is insufficient to safeguard work and consumer
interests those groups must presently appeal to national or subnational governments for redress of grievances relating to
international corporate operations. Allowing these groups meaningful
participation in corporate governance would provide important,
perhaps the only, access that ordinary people have to actively
participate in international politics.190 International firms are already
subject to international governance through shareholder suffrage, so
adding workers and consumers into the mix would only alter the linedrawing among stakeholders where national political boundaries have
already been breached.
CONCLUSION
In American history, corporations have, in their better uses,
advanced both individual liberty and social organization. The colonial
corporations of the seventeenth and eighteenth century provided a
mechanism through which communities thrived in the New World,
where individuals could never have made it alone.191 In the nineteenth
century, Jacksonians demanded the widespread availability of the
corporate form in order to crush monopoly and democratize

188. See generally Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Economics of Loyalty Discounts and
Antitrust Law in the United States, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Autumn 2005, at 115
(summarizing widespread use of consumer loyalty programs in retail markets).
189. See Yosifon, supra note 2, at 302–12 (exploring the mechanics of expanding
corporate voting).
190. See Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction
and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 599 (2004) (discussing
Ann-Marie Slaughter’s historical account claiming that the progenitors of international
trade-liberalizing legislation initially expected the development of international political
organs to help manage the new economic landscape that their reforms would bring forth).
191. See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT
HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 17 (2003) (noting that Massachusetts and Virginia
both came into being as chartered corporations).
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economic opportunity and its attendant political advantage.192 The
twentieth century saw the expansion of corporate democracy through
the development of robust and fluid capital markets and the
emergence of institutional shareholders. The strength of these
developments, even while advancing individual and collective wellbeing, have eclipsed other institutions traditionally devoted to
safeguarding human flourishing, including families, communities,
voluntary associations, and government.193 Corporate law’s task in the
twenty-first century must be the expansion of corporate governance
concerns and the corporate franchise to all corporate stakeholders
who, after Citizens United, can no longer rely exclusively on external
regulatory institutions to safeguard their interests, but must instead
look to the corporation—an association in which, our best corporate
theory informs us, they are already essential participants.

192. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, at 2
(1991) (“The modern business corporation had its origin in the general corporation acts
[of the Jacksonian era], one of the most important legal accomplishments of a regime bent
on democratizing and deregulating American business.”).
193. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 451–53 (reviewing expansion of
equity holding class in the twentieth century).

